

*The Significance of Meaning in
Pragmatism and Neo-Realism*

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MEANING
IN PRAGMATISM AND NEO-REALISM

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The following dissertation represents a real growth in my interpretation of the pragmatist-realist controversy. Needless to say, it does not aim to settle the dispute but rather to make more articulate the issue between the two schools. It is hoped that the position taken herein may be found helpful and stimulating.

Since this study was undertaken a new species of realism has been evolved. I have not attempted to incorporate *Critical Realism* into the discussion as I do not regard it as essentially different from other types of realism. Realism is *realism* despite its various species.

It has been my aim to be fair to both viewpoints throughout the discussion. For my sympathetic understanding of the realistic position, I am indebted to Professors R. B. Perry and E. G. Spaulding of Harvard and Princeton Universities respectively. I wish also to acknowledge my indebtedness to the men of the Philosophy Department in The University of Chicago, particularly to Professors G. H. Mead and A. W. Moore of that department. For many suggestions in connection with its publication and for his help in reading the proofs, I owe much to my friend, Dr. H. S. Mahood.

R. N. B.

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The Significance of Meaning in Pragmatism and Neo-Realism

INTRODUCTION

The philosophy of a period reflects the method which its science employs. To such an extent is this true that the entire social structure is permeated with its effects. This has never been better illustrated than in the contrast between modern and Aristotelian science. Ancient science was a matter of definition and classification. A thing was known according to its essential attributes; to determine these and thus place the individual or the thing in his or its logical position in the natural hierarchy were the two main objects of science. The world was arranged in a complex order of genera and species with their various differentia. This method of classification held sway until the beginning of the modern period with the introduction of the so-called "inductive" method. The biological sciences were the last to be influenced by the new movement, and it was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that the old method crumbled under its own weight in these sciences. The naturalist had erected such an intricate, complex classificatory table of organic and vital phenomena that it was only natural that active minds should seek an explanation as to the origin of, and the relationship between, the different orders which nature presented. The old method thus paved the way for the introduction of the evolutionary hypothesis which found its best expression in the celebrated work of Darwin.

The influence of Aristotelianism upon the social fabric is shown by the order of society which arose through the mediaeval feudal structure. Both the church and the state were organized upon this basis and indeed the entire papal controversy, stated in logical terms, was as to which should be the *Summum Genus* or the *Genus Generalissimum*—the king or the pope. Both were agreed that this dignified position,

properly speaking, belonged to the Deity, but after giving Him this recognition, they were quite content to give Him the celestial while they should have the terrestrial world for themselves. In fact the history of democracy from the exacting of Magna Charta from King John in 1215, the Petition of Rights of 1628 and Bill of Rights of 1688, down through the French and American revolutions, the upheavals of continental Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century, to the great world war, are nothing more than attempts to rid the world of an Aristotelian society. The task is by no means complete as the present situation indicates.

Modern science is not interested in the essence of things. It is not the "what" as such, but the "what it does," from which modern science takes its cue. How does the thing act? What is its function? What does it *mean*?* These are the questions from which present-day science takes its departure from ancient science. So in a democratic society we are not interested in who an individual happens to be but in what he can do. His mere being is of no great consequence either one way or the other. His name, just as that of a thing, stands for a meaning, a function, a work that is done. The determination of the "what" or the "who" is important only in so far as it stands for a convenient symbol which represents a certain meaning, a definite kind of activity or a relatively fixed function. A thing or an individual *is* as it or he functions.

Since the downfall of scholasticism, philosophy has constantly been reminded of the "sins of the Fathers" and has been subjected to the most adverse criticism because of its being so abstract and speculative, so impractical. The philosopher, in his attempt to find Reality, became so far removed from reality, that even today two distinct attitudes toward him are quite pronounced. He is either looked upon with the greatest of reverence, as sort of an awe inspiring individual or is treated as a specimen of curiosity or as a personage for contempt. So many have been the attempts to bring philosophy back to earth that to those outside the philosophic world, the news that thinking has at last found its home will no doubt be received with some degree of skepticism. Especially

*Meaning is here used in a functional sense. The Aristotelian would have asked this question but his meaning would have referred to a Platonic essence.

is this true when we consider Hegel's most admirable attempt to ally philosophy with science and then recall how his efforts only resulted in the most impossible of all unintelligible philosophies! However this may be, both the new realism and pragmatism are putting forth their claims to do this very thing. It is the purpose of the present investigation to estimate the claims of each in the light of the above statement as to the interests of science. Paradoxical as it may seem, Prof. Spaulding's effort to "de-thingize"¹ the world is what makes his attitude scientific. Pragmatism is viewed by some as sort of a "second-edition of the natural sciences," while some realists have accused it of being nothing but "naturalism brought up-to-date." Both the realist and the pragmatist are agreed that the idealist is hopeless when it comes to having a working criterion for truth and error, but each accuses the other of being in the same predicament. Both claim to be equally scientific, yet their logics are quite different. The dissertation aims to show the concept of *meaning* as the central issue in these diverging logics.

Despite Prof. Spaulding's contention that we have philosophical problems quite independent of their history,² it would be well to pause and see if, after all, the historical setting of a problem does not affect the problem. Perhaps by so doing some light may be thrown on the realistic-pragmatic controversy. Had Prof. Spaulding been a little less convinced that philosophical problems persist regardless of their history, he might have seen that his own *New Rationalism* is pregnant with conclusions that are based upon a logic which arose out of a controversial setting. It would seem quite possible to show that the pragmatists and the realists find their different meanings of "meaning" out of the character of the controversies from which the schools arose and that consequently their meanings must be translated into a different setting in order to apply to each other. The following chapter aims to place the respective meanings in their historical setting.

1. The New Rationalism, Ch. III.

2. The New Rationalism, Ch. I.

CHAPTER I.

The Absolustic-Idealistic Background

If there be anything that is now a truism it is the fact that we cannot hope to understand any movement until we know something of the circumstances and conditions under which it arose, the historical setting and the social background which gave rise to it. In thus separating ourselves from the social *milieu* in which we happen to be moving and putting ourselves into the situation we are trying to understand, we become sympathetic or are at least better able to approach our problem with a sympathetic attitude. Failure to see the other man's viewpoint together with the divine approval of what happens in a community consciousness, have been a constant source of wars and struggles in the past. Although the thinking world has long been rid of this fallacy, it is rather interesting to note that in our attitude toward the recent war we have been as absolute and dogmatic in our judgments as people of the days of St. Anselm or St. Thomas Aquinas.

Idealism has long been aware of the necessity of getting things in their proper relation, so much so in fact that it has not been satisfied in stopping with anything short of the universe. In attempting to analyze any given situation, in order properly to understand it, the idealist found it necessary to drag in the whole universe, so intricate is the relationship between things. But in so doing, he has left us in a position little, if any, better than we were with our tribal consciousness. In the last analysis, idealism has only substituted an Absolute approval for what had hitherto been communal, thus making the causes for struggle and sources for misunderstandings all the more intense.

So, in order to see clearly the issue between pragmatism and realism we should, at least for a few moments, detach ourselves from the present stage of the conflict and enter the discussions where the movements first appear. For this purpose let us follow in brief some of the developments of romantic or absolute idealism.

The Unknowable which Kant had been willing to leave as such except for the mere postulation of its being, became the chief interest of the romanticists and it was to get in touch with the world ground that was the cause of all their strivings. Instead of remaining unknowable it takes the form of an Absolute Self with whom it is the business of human selves to get in communication. In so doing one finds his true self. It is only in losing oneself in the Absolute that one finds himself. Human personality is completely lost in the Absolute. When this is accomplished then has one reached the highest state of perfection.

Various devices for getting in touch with the Absolute began to appear. For Fichte the world was moral to the core. It was made as it is that the moral self might be realized. In overcoming the obstacles which the world everywhere presented, one was realizing his moral self and was thus approaching nearer to the goal of all effort, viz., that of becoming the Absolute. With Schelling the world presented the characteristics of beauty throughout. He saw nature from the standpoint of the artist. The artist in creating his object was only following the same course which nature was everywhere pursuing. His conception, however, is a little more positive than that of Fichte's for with Schelling one must create in order to get in touch with the Absolute. With Fichte it was simply a matter of setting up an object only to knock it down again; in so doing one was doing his duty; but with Schelling one must not only knock down the fence but he must get over it, must do something, must create something. With Hegel the world is rational through and through; whatever *is*, is rational. It is through Reason that one finds the Absolute. Thought is only the Absolute becoming conscious of Himself. History is the Absolute Person realizing himself. He therefore works through the State; the state is the highest embodiment of Reason; in the state Reason reaches its zenith. In order to realize oneself one must give oneself up to the state for it is in so doing that one identifies himself with the Absolute Reason. It is this aspect of Hegel's philosophy that Treitschke made explicit and which together with Kant's blind and empty categorical imperative to which it gave a definite

content, that has no doubt given a tremendous moral and religious support to the war.¹

Romantic idealism, in its endeavor to reduce the world and all that is to a single personal attribute, had deprived it of all meaning whatsoever. The dialectic² proceeds somewhat as follows: One would like to believe that the world is of the character which he would most like to have it. A moral being introspects his own consciousness and finds a moral conscience within. He then tries to make nature conform to the conception of morality which he finds. But when he examines nature he finds facts which somehow do not quite measure up to the conception of morality with which he started. The cyclones, tornadoes, earthquakes and other "unforeseen acts of God" do not seem "good" in the sense with which he began his inquiry. They do not meet his approval but how shall he condemn them for are they not good? The ultimate character of things is moral, nevertheless. It may be barely possible that he has been mistaken as to what constitutes morality and since the nature of things is moral, his conception can only be checked up by further and more extended observations of nature. Thus he may do either of two things: He is either compelled to bring nature up to the ideal conception from which he began his inquiry or is forced to lower his own conception so as to include the wars, famines, pestilences, crimes and all the tragedies of life. He may still insist that these are "good" but it is quite obvious that in so doing he has robbed the term of all its meaning. When everything is good there is nothing that is *really good*. Idealism, in its endeavor to eliminate evil from reality, has also vanquished the good, the very thing which it wished to preserve. The same dialectic holds when we try to reduce reality to any single category, whether it be that of morality, beauty, reason, will or what not. The very meaning which you wish to preserve loses all content in the process. The Idealists, like Spinoza, in their endeavor to view things *sub specie aeternitatis* had lost sight of any distinction between the good and the bad, the moral and the immoral. What program cannot be justified from the standpoint of eternity! You can justify anything, no matter how vicious it may be in

1. Dewey: German Philosophy and Politics, Lecture III.

2. Cf. Perry: Present Conflict of Ideals, Ch. XVIII.

its content, when you once take this standpoint. Such a philosophy has no working criterion for distinguishing the good and the bad and it was for this that the pragmatist called the idealist to account.

The same difficulty arises when we come to account for the distinction between truth and error. "It was in defense of social order and values that Plato—not Moses, nor Parmenides—fixed 'real species' with a fixity that has held for twenty-three centuries."¹ In order to combat successfully the "vicious relativism" of the Sophists as expressed in the Protagorean doctrine that "Man is the measure of all things," he had to find some common stuff out of which knowledge is made. This he found in his metaphysical Idea, the universal, the pattern from which particulars are drawn. In order to relieve us from the skepticism of the *homo mensura* doctrine, he established truth on such a firm basis that it became impossible for human beings ever to be in error.² In this respect absolute idealism is quite on a plane with the old Platonic idealism (now realism) in that endeavoring to save truth from a Berkeleyan subjectivism—equally as mischievous as the old Protagorean relativism—it, too, has not only failed to find a working criterion for truth but has made it equally as impossible for such a thing as error ever to take place. This we shall see from the following discussion of Prof. Bosanquet.

Bosanquet defines judgment as the "reference of an ideal content to reality."³ In this statement the subject of the judgment is always reality while the predicate is composed of the "ideal content" which is attributed to it. Reality itself furnishes us the data while the meaning is found in the ideal content which is predicated of it. This initial chasm between reality as represented in the subject and an ideal content as represented by the predicate is going to furnish us with a number of neat difficulties. It is quite desirable that we be able to know reality, otherwise our knowledge would be illusory. The subject of any judgment must be reality itself but that reality, from Bosanquet's point of view, exists independently of the judgment itself. Our ideas must reproduce a reality which exists apart from the judging process. But if we are to know

1. A. W. Moore: *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, p. 35.

2. *Ibid.*, Ch. III.

3. Bosanquet: *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 1.

reality we must do so by our judgments about it. In every judgment, however, the actual subject is gained through perception and is only an idea of reality. Thus when I judge that "the type is large" it is not the type itself that appears in the judgment but the idea of the type. Consequently the judgment is not of reality but only relates two ideas to one another and reality itself is not known in the judgment. It is not reality itself of which an idea is predicated but only an idea of reality.¹

Granted, for the sake of argument, that reality does appear in the subject of a judgment, the question then arises as to the relationship between the part which appears and the whole of reality. Each judgment is fragmentary for in each judgment only a part of reality is given. From these partial bits of reality how are we to construct the whole, the complete and finished system of which Bosanquet conceives? Our judgments get meaning only in so far as they are referred to the whole of reality but how are we to know the nature of the whole? It can never be given in judgment itself for then our subject and predicate would merge into one; the ideal and the real would coincide and we should have no judgment at all. We should have only a bare identity. The Absolute alone—for which we are thankful—is capable of such judgments. Such a judgment would be as meaningless and blank as Schelling's Absolute which Hegel characterized as a "universal night in which all cows are black."

Bosanquet sees the difficulty in setting up a reality with which thought must correspond and which is independent of judgment. Consequently he brings reality back into the judgment in order that it may be known. The following passage shows that he is conscious of the dilemma in which he is placed and his attempt to wrestle with it.

"The Reality to which we ascribe the predicate is undoubtedly self-existent; it is not merely in my mind or in my act of judgment; if it were, the judgment would only be a game with my ideas. . . . Still the reality which attracts my concentrated attention is also within my act of judgment; it is not even the whole of reality present to my perception; still less of course the whole self-existent Reality which I dimly

1. Cf. Helen B. Thompson: *Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment in Studies in Logical Theory*, pp. 86-96.

presuppose. . . . *This Reality is in my judgment; it is the point at which the actual world impinges upon my consciousness as real, and it is only by judging with reference to this point that I can refer the ideal content before my mind to the whole of reality which I at once believe to exist, and am attempting to construct. The Subject is both in and out of the Judgment, as Reality is both in and out of my consciousness.*"¹

Obviously to say that the subject is both *in* and *out* of the judgment does not solve the difficulty; it recognizes it but like most of these "both-and" relations, which start with a fundamental dualism, is quite unintelligible.

The antithesis between thought and reality leads Bosanquet into the following dilemma: reality must be outside of the judgment, otherwise we should know only our ideas; but if it is, we can never know it. It must, therefore, be inside of the judgment for us to know it but in so placing it, we have only a knowledge of our ideas. Therefore, it must be "both in and out," whatever that may mean.

We find the same sort of difficulties in the ideal world as were noted in the real. An idea is a meaning and as such is applicable to a number of particulars but an idea as image, as psychical content is particular. How the particular image is related to the universal meaning is a problem similar to that of how the subject is related to reality.² As meaning an idea must refer to a reality beyond itself but how this is to be done, we have already seen Bosanquet is somewhat embarrassed in accounting for. The situation is very well stated by Dr. Thompson in the following words:

"If the predicate is to be affirmed of reality (and if it be³ not, it has no logical value), then it must, when affirmed, be in some sense an accurate representation of reality. But the predicate is an idea, and, moreover, an idea which is, both in its existence and meaning palpably the outcome of transformations wrought upon given sensory contents by the individual consciousness. Since the one point of contact with reality is a sensory experience, the more simple sensory experiences are reacted upon and worked over, the farther they recede from reality. The idea seems, therefore, in its very essence, a thing which never can be affirmed of reality. As image it is itself a

1. Logic, Vol. I, pp. 113-14 (i Ed.) quoted from Dr. Thompson.

2. Studies in Logical Theory, pp. 96-106.

3. Ibid, pp. 101-02.

reality, but not affirmed; as meaning it is the reality (the image) manipulated for individual ends. Why suppose that by distorting reality we get it in shape to affirm *of* reality? Moreover, the farther an idea is removed from immediate sensory experience—in other words, the more abstract it becomes—the less is the possibility of affirming of reality. The final outcome of this point of view, if we adhere rigorously to its logic is that the more thinking we do, the less we know about the real world.”

The outcome of Bosanquet’s position is that we are unable to know reality. Neither our sense data nor our world of meanings has any reference to the real world. The data are always the representation of the world as it appears to us as individuals while the objective world of meanings to which our ideas have reference, are powerless to go beyond themselves so as to reach reality; they prove only the conventionalized constructs of human beings. Neither in subject nor in predicate is reality anywhere known and knowledge turns out to be exactly what Bosanquet asserted that it was not, viz., a relation between ideas. The reality that those ideas are supposed to represent is never given so that it is impossible to know when our ideas are a true or a false representation of the real world. How are we to know when our ideas do correspond to reality when we can never know the nature of reality?

When Bosanquet comes to the discussion of inference the gap between the objective world of meanings and reality seems to have been mysteriously bridged and so well has the bridge been constructed that it becomes quite impossible for the traveler ever to fall off into the depths of error. Inference differs from judgment in that it is a mediate reference of an ideal content to reality,¹ *i. e.* the reference is made through a universal. We have already noted that in judgment the idea has no way of referring to reality, but in inference it is reality itself that is working through us; the idea is the universal and the universal is the reality that is operating within us. If you make the judgment that “the man is stupid” and somebody asks you for evidence, you immediately give reasons such as that he works diligently but never seems to know anything; he talks incessantly but never has anything to say and that

1. Logic, Vol. II, Ch. I, pp. 1-4.

it seems to be the general opinion among those who know him, etc. In these cases the meanings operate within us as inferences from the first judgment. Just why these particular ideas should happen to come in substantiation of the meaning of "stupid" in preference to any number of others that might occur, this theory of inference is unable to account for. Given a universal in judgment and the other universals simply come through inference. How can they be false for in each case it is a fragment of reality that is working within us. Why should Reality, the Whole, the Absolute ever condescend to send even a most infinitesimal part of himself through me, a poor, finite being? What could possibly be the motive on the part of the Absolute for such a procedure as this? He must indeed be a very gracious Absolute that he should stoop to humble himself in this manner.

Each universal is a bit of reality and granted that these universals do operate within us as Bosanquet claims they do, then we have immediately precluded the possibility for error. If it is reality itself that is working through us, how would it be possible to err? If the universals are operating effectively, reality must be known as it actually is and there is no room for error. Error can only be accounted for by means of a false universal, but when it is reality that is at work within us, how could such a thing be possible? A false universal is a self-destructive term; it would be an unreal real. Granted, however, that there are such, when should we know when we had captured a true or a false universal? The argument reduces itself to the following dilemma: We must either admit that the universals are operating within us or that they are not so doing; if we admit that they are, then does it become impossible ever to be in error; if we take the other horn of the dilemma and maintain that the universals do not operate within us, then the whole theory is false for this is the central contention of the position. Even though there could be such a thing as a false universal, we could not be mistaken in our inference for it would have to operate as such through us.

In attempting to bridge the gap between the ideal and the real, which Bosanquet's conception of judgment carries with it, he has identified the two in inference, only at the expense

of error. He is now in just the opposite position from that in which the account of judgment left him. There it was impossible to know the real world but now it is equally as impossible ever to be mistaken in regard to our inferences about it. In judgment we are living in a world all of which is an illusion; in inference we are dwelling in a world where all things are true. Thus if we stick to the system, the universal of the absolute idealist performs the same function as the old Platonic Idea. It establishes truth so firmly that it makes it quite impossible ever to account for error. The problem is the reverse from the one with which we set out.¹ Then there seemed to be no truth for all was subject to illusion and mere appearance, but now all is truth and there is no such thing as error.

Experience gets meaning for the idealist in so far as it is referred to the Whole. He does attempt to account for error by the partialness of judgment, but obviously, since all judgments are necessarily partial, truth is on the same plane with error. The only difference between truth and error is one of degrees. In so far as our judgments approximate the Whole of Reality, they become true and are false in proportion as they fail to relate themselves to the whole of experience. Since the Absolute contains all experience, He alone is capable of knowing The Truth. All judgments are necessarily partial—with the exception of those of the Absolute, which are not judgments at all—but some are less partial than others.

We thus have degrees of partialness so that those judgments that are more partial contain a greater amount of error than those which are less so. This works very nicely until we begin to apply it, but how are we to know to what extent our judgments are partial when we have no way of knowing the whole? With this conception of truth, how would you go about it to determine the truth or falsity of a judgment? You are hungry and judge that the food which you see will satisfy your hunger, and yet you have no way of estimating the truth of your judgment only as you refer it to the universe-at-large. Absolute Truth is indeed gratifying but as a hungry individual you might starve during the complex process of "otheration."

1. Cf. Moore: *Pragmatism and its Critics*, Ch. III.

How much help would you receive on a problem should you go to Mr. Joachim and he should speak thus with you:

"Truth, we said, was the systematic coherence which¹ characterized a significant whole. And we proceeded to identify a significant whole with 'an organized individual experience, self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled.' Now there can be one *and only one* such experience: or *only one* significant whole, the significance of which is self-contained in the sense required. For it is *absolute* self-fulfillment, *absolutely* self-contained significance, that is postulated; and nothing short of *absolute* individuality—nothing short of *the* completely whole experience—can satisfy this postulate. And human knowledge—not merely *my* knowledge or *yours*, but the best and fullest knowledge in the world at any stage of its development—is clearly not a significant whole in this ideally complete sense. Hence, the truth, which our sketch described, is—from the point of view of the human intelligence—an Ideal, and an Ideal which can never *as such*, or in its completeness, be actual as human experience."

If the idealist's account of truth is true, then his own statement is not the correct one for it can only be partially true. Since all judgments are partial, his conception of truth is not quite true.² It is a judgment about truth and as such is partial and hence not exactly true. Whether it be Prof. Royce's "purposive Absolute" or Mr. Joachim's "systematic coherence of a significant whole" or Mr. Bradley's "whole of sentience," the same criticism applies. Like Kant and Spencer, they seem to know more about the "unknowable"—the Absolute in this case—than their own partial judgments would warrant.

A philosophy which finds it possible to convert deliberately evil into good, which makes the ultimate character of things so perfect that there is no chance for error and which is so interested in the Absolute that it entirely forgets humanity, is radically defective for the kind of a world in which we as human beings have elected to dwell. It is to remedy some of these defects that the pragmatist comes to the rescue.³ As to how well he succeeds we shall see later but we are here concerned in noting that it is to combat the absolutistic extremes into which idealism had led that the pragmatist first

1. Nature of Truth, pp. 78, 79.

2. Cf. Bertrand Russell: Philosophical Essays, pp. 153, 54.

3. Cf. Moore: Pragmatism and Its Critics, Ch. IV.

appears in the scenes. Pragmatism then, arose as a revolt against absolutism. As the leader of such a revolt, it aims to uphold the counter thesis of the relativity of truth. It is with this position that pragmatism starts. It has come to stand for very much more than this but it is quite possible to show that its later developments have come as the result of defending its initial thesis. Instrumentalism will be placed in this connection at another point in the discussion. The important point for us to hold in mind is that pragmatism developed as a reaction against absolutism. Absolutism in politics gave way long before absolutism in thought and it will not be until the latter too, has given way, that the world will be made safe for democracy. Pragmatism in this sense is the champion of democracy. It gets its first meaning in the absolutistic controversy.

The pragmatist has the realist's most hearty co-operation—even though the latter does have room for absolute truths. For him there are many truths and not one Truth—in his endeavor to make the idealist live in a world very different in character from the one he has pictured and in which he would so much like to dwell. It is not the absolutistic character of idealism in which the realist is primarily interested. This does not seem nearly so repugnant to him as the very *ideal* character itself. Realism protests against the subjectivistic extremes into which idealism had fallen, and to understand its polemic, we shall have to go back to Bishop Berkeley's teachings.

The key to Berkeley's position is that things have their being in so far as they are perceived. Their *esse* is their *percepti*. This he established by means of a syllogism which may be stated somewhat as follows: There can be no being apart from quality; there can be no quality apart from the mind; therefore, there can be no being apart from the mind. If you were to abstract all the qualities from an object, you would get pure being, but pure being would be nothing. It is probably in this sense that Hegel thinks of "being" and "nothing" as synonymous. But if we are to have a *being* about which you may speak intelligently it must possess some qualities. That there can be no qualities apart from the mind, is

the old story as to whether there would be sound if there were no ear to hear it, color if there were no eye to see it, etc. From this, the argument runs, it would follow that the ultimate character of things must be *mental* or *ideal*. The realist insists that there is a *real* world which exists quite independently of its being perceived and furthermore, that its character is not mental.

To prove his position the realist has found it necessary to point out the fallacies in the proofs of idealism and to erect a logical structure in defense of his own thesis of independence. Thus Mr. Russell shows how we must distinguish between the psychical process by means of which a thing is known and the thing known.¹ The act of knowledge is mental but this is no reason why we should say that the thing known is of that character. Dr. Montague finds it his duty to refute Berkeleyan idealism and does so by pointing out the fallacy of "psychophysical metonymy"² involved in the argument. He states the argument in the following syllogism in *Barbara*: "*Ideas are incapable of existing apart from a mind. Physical objects in so far as they are perceived or known at all are certainly 'ideas.'* All physical objects are, therefore, incapable of existing apart from a mind."³ He then points out the same fallacy as noted above by Mr. Russell, only the latter is not so skillful in naming it. It is due to the ambiguity of the word "idea" which is used in the major premise to denote "the act or process of perceiving, while in the minor premise it is used to denote the object of that act, *i. e.*, the thing or content that is perceived." This "verbal fallacy of psychophysical metonymy" is only a new way of saying the old formal fallacy of "ambiguous middle."

Berkeley's refutation of Locke's representative theory of knowledge is accepted by the realist as establishing "epistemological monism." The former argued that if our ideas are like reality, the representation is redundant and that if they are not like reality, we can have no knowledge; in either case the representation is useless. With the epistemological monism of the idealist, the realist agrees but that the knowl-

1. Cf. Russell: *Problems of Philosophy*, Ch. IV.

2. Cf. *The New Realism*, p. 256 ff.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 258.

edge relation is one between the mind and its ideas, he cannot accept. He sees another alternative which is that of having the objects act directly upon us so that knowing becomes a "mind-object" rather than a "mind-idea" relation.¹ We do not have knowledge of "ideas" but knowledge of "objects."

Prof. Perry attacks the idealist by showing that he has argued from the standpoint of the "ego-centric predicament." This fallacy consists in arguing from the fact that whenever anything is discovered, it is always found in the knowledge relation to the assumption that knowing is a necessary condition for being. It involves either the "redundant inference that all known things are known, or the false inference that all things are known."² It is of course impossible to examine the character of things when not known but from this it cannot be argued that knowing is in any way related to being. This is exactly the procedure of the argument from the ego-centric predicament. It assumes that because knowledge is necessary to the discovery of an object, it is therefore constitutive of that object. The realist admits the difficulty in the method of procedure in being unable to eliminate the knower from an act of knowledge, as would obviously be necessary in showing the nature of things when not known, but fails to see, how because of this predicament, one is able to argue that knowing is essential to being.

This predicament together with the fallacy of "initial predication," constitute the historic proofs for idealism.³ This latter fallacy consists in defining a thing in terms of the initial relationship with which one happens to meet it. The relationship may be entirely accidental and have nothing to do with the essence of the entity so defined but because one happens to meet with it in this relation, he proceeds to define the object accordingly. It is by means of such a definition that idealism reduces the character of things to *ideas*, finding them to be of this nature when they are known. (The argument is of course based upon an epistemological monism, which holds that we have knowledge only of our ideas, an epistemological monism which, as already noted, the realist rejects.) But

1. Cf. Perry: *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 119-132.

2. *The New Realism*, pp. 11, 12.

3. Cf. *Ibid*, pp. 128-32.

even if the theory be true, the realist contends that we have no right to frame our definition according to it because it may be only an accidental relation.

Closely connected with this fallacy is that of "exclusive particularity,"¹ which fails to recognize that a term may stand in more than one relation and still be the same term. Thus a man may be a member of a church, a business concern, a university or any number of social groups and still be the same man.* To define him in terms of the church, which happens to be the first relation in which we find him in this case, is obviously misleading; but this is exactly what the idealist does when he makes being dependent upon knowledge. It is as absurd as it would be to define a gambler as one who goes to church because you might happen to meet him in this connection for the first time. Just how the realist knows when he has the essential attributes of an entity, is rather difficult to say, but we shall return to this difficulty at another point.

Realism has tried to force the idealist to recognize the fact that there is a real world which exists quite independently of its being known. Idealism bravely faced the realist and tried to make him see that it is not subjective in character any longer but that it had become *objective*, just as objective in fact as his own real world. But the hard-hearted realist was not satisfied with this concession on the part of the idealist and even refused to believe him, holding that in so far as idealism had become objective, it had become realistic, that it is impossible for idealism ever to become really objective² and that it is inherently subjectivistic. In other words, "objective idealism" is a self-destructive term, as meaningless as a "democratic military discipline," or a Kaiser to make the world safe for democracy.

Not satisfied with this, the realist also found the fact that the ultimate character of things is *mental*, very repulsive to him and again summoned the idealist into court. He not only challenged the position that things have no being apart

1. Cf. *The New Realism*, p. 14.

2. Cf. Perry: *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 162 f.

*The question may well be raised as to what extent the man is the same man when he comes into relationship with these different social groups. This offers a good example of how impossible it is to get any meaning into a bare, metaphysical individual. See James's chapter on *The Self*.

from their being known but also the phenomenalist position that knowledge is constitutive of its object. Things are different when in the knowledge relation than they really are, *i. e.*, when apart from that relation. Knowledge is either necessary for the being of things or else it modifies their character in such a way as to make it impossible to know them as they really are, the Kantian position. Idealism thus found itself caught between the scylla of Berkeleyan subjectivism on the one hand and the charybdis of Kantian phenomenism on the other. It is safely to guide the philosophical ship between these dangerous cliffs that the realist appears as the pilot who knows the waters. He is able to know reality and furthermore knows it as something other than mental.

The cardinal thesis for realism then is that of independence. It is primarily a protest against Berkeleyan idealism but there is also another motif in realism, which although a reaction against subjectivism, cannot be attributed as hailing from a special antipathy for the Bishop. This motif arises as a repugnance on the part of some "tough-minded" individuals to be asked to think in terms of selves rather than things as absolute idealism would have us do. We have noted how the romanticist attempted to reduce the world to one category, that category always standing for some attribute of self which seemed most pleasing to the philosopher who was in quest of the Absolute. The result is that before very long the romanticist had lost sight of the external world and had swallowed it up in his self, or if he were not quite capable of containing it all, the Absolute was so that it made no difference as to the virtual extinction of the external world. The realist refuses to have the real world swallowed up in any way, whether it be by a fragmentary self like his own or that of the Absolute. With a somewhat different motif, absolute idealism had landed us in a subjective world which is not much of an improvement over the Berkeleyan subjectivism. The latter had brought us there through epistemology, while the absolutist was asking us to dwell there for sentimental reasons. The realist, who believes in facing facts, revolted against this sentimentalism of the romanticist and sought a way out of the epistemological difficulty so that we might again live in a real world, one which is in no way influenced

by what any particular individual happens to think about it.¹

Just as history has had a tendency to move through reactions, so thought has had a tendency to move from pole to pole. Indeed it is this tendency on the part of thought so to move that has no doubt done much in shaping history's course, for the two cannot be separated from each other. The excesses into which idealism had fallen caused reactions against it, both upon its absolutistic and its idealistic sides. The Hegelian dialectic has evidently been at work, for poor idealism, attacked for its absolutistic platform by the pragmatist and its idealistic dogma by the realist, has now no place to lay its head in comfort, except as it subside in peace and be content to breathe no more. Yet, because of its religious implications, it will probably continue to find many an ardent champion and defender.

Idealism must have been conscious of its own defects as a method of getting around in the world, for the Hegelian dialectic plainly shows us that we cannot "ride any horse too far," that, if we do, he soon becomes tired and ceases to be himself by generating his own opposite. It evidently did not profit by the teachings of its own logic but continued its search for The Absolute so that humanity was quite forgotten in the quest. Although pragmatism arose as a revolt against absolutism, it has not followed the course of the Hegelian logic—perhaps because of its humanistic motif—by setting up its own absolute. The rather has it learned the truth of the very simple but equally profound maxim of Aristotle's that "Virtue is a mean between extremes." It thus hopes to prevent the world's having to progress through the march of revolutions followed by counter-revolutions. It hopes to put a stop to the operation of the Hegelian dialectic in society. It aims to show that progress among a people may come through the opposition of particulars to universals rather than through that of universals pitted against each other. In other words, intelligent progress comes through evolution and not by revolution. Science does not start with a conflict between universals but from the conflict of a particular or particulars with a universal. The former is Hegelian and is revolutionary; the latter is pragmatic and evolutionary. Prog-

1. Cf. *The New Realism*, pp. 2-11.

ress is not progress if it is made at too great a cost and if it can only come through the opposition of universals, it often defeats itself, even though in the "long run" the world may be ahead. The only trouble with the "long run" is that we have to know when to stop running, otherwise we run into eternity and as already pointed out, that standpoint robs the world of all meaning and value. If we run too far, humanity will always be getting ready for a better day but no generation will ever be ready to really *live*. This is the fallacy of wars in the interest of an abstract humanity. If the Hegelian dialectic is scientific, wars are necessary for progress, but if the pragmatic method is scientific, progress is quite possible without them. History has moved in the past according to this dialectic. It rests with us whether it shall continue so to move.

The realist is quite in sympathy with the pragmatist in refusing to be swallowed up by The Absolute or any other kind of an absolute for that matter. The pragmatist has thrown absolutism out of court altogether but the realist in throwing it out of the door of his real and independent world has let it in again through the window of his subsistentia entities. It does not come in as a Whole but only piecemeal. The idealist lets the absolute in wholly, the realist lets him in on the installment plan while the pragmatist refuses him admittance at any point and even locks doors and windows to keep him out if necessary. The pragmatist abhors an absolute.

Realism now stands for much more than the thesis of independence, *i. e.*, the existence of things apart from their being known, but just as it is possible to show that instrumentalism is an outgrowth of the thesis of the relativity of truth from the pragmatic point of view, so is it quite possible to show that the later developments of realism have come as efforts to uphold its original thesis. The above discussion shows that pragmatism and realism did not arise in opposition to one another but that they have both come as revolts against idealism, the pragmatist attacking the absolutistic plank while the realist attacks the idealistic plank of the idealist's program. Since these two schools did not arise in the same controversy, they obviously cannot meet each other with the same weapons that they have employed in facing their

opponents. Realism gets its meaning in opposition to subjectivism. The question now is: Can realism continue to use the same arguments against pragmatism that it has used in combating subjective idealism? If the pragmatist grants the existence of a real world apart from the field of awareness, this evidently is not the issue between pragmatism and realism. The present thesis holds that the pragmatist does grant the existence of a real world and that the issue between realism and pragmatism is that of *meaning*. Pragmatism and realism cannot get on common ground for controversial purposes until this issue is recognized. The realist must face the pragmatist on the issue of *meaning*. He must meet this issue and meet it squarely.

The two following chapters will be devoted to a discussion of "meaning" in realism and pragmatism respectively. In the last chapter we shall give a critical comparison of the two positions respecting this issue.

CHAPTER II.

The Position of Meaning in Realism

We have seen that realism arose in opposition to subjectivism, taking as its counter thesis that of independence. The following is an attempt to show how the logical structure of the position has developed as an endeavor to prove the original contention and at the same time discover the position of meaning in the system.

Kant's contention that his predecessors, as well as contemporary metaphysicians, had been misled because they had attempted to solve the problem of *being* without having first inquired into the limits of human knowledge, is directly challenged by the neo-realists.¹ In other words, Kant maintains that we have no right to talk about metaphysics until we have first examined the possibilities of knowledge, not as a psychological process but as knowledge in general, knowledge *überhaupt*. Epistemology must always precede metaphysics and to attempt to discuss Being without having first asked ourselves as to what we can know, is putting the cart before the horse. To this the realist replies that philosophy has been vitiated since the time of Kant because it has given priority to epistemology and that it was not Kant's predecessors who were in error but Kant himself. The former were in error, not because they had not consciously faced Kant's problem but because their metaphysics had been vitiated by epistemology. Wherein they differed from Kant was that a knowledge of reality is possible while for him we have knowledge only of phenomena. However this may be, whether reality be knowable or unknowable, the conclusions are invalidated for metaphysics has been subordinated to epistemology. Both phenomenalism and idealism give preference to epistemology over metaphysics and to this the realist objects, holding that knowing has nothing whatever to do with being, that things exist quite apart from their being known. This philosophy endeavors to emancipate metaphysics from epistemology which is only another way of saying, to prove the independence of being over knowing.

1. Cf. *The New Realism*, pp. 13-60.

As the first step in this emancipation of metaphysics from epistemology comes a reformation in logic. Logic is henceforth not to be conceived of as having anything whatever to do with thinking but as something which is objective and entirely independent of thought.¹ Logic is just as objective as physics and chemistry or any other science for that matter, and is to be studied empirically in the same way as one would study the sciences just mentioned. Just as mathematical principles hold regardless of whether or not the mind ever thinks them, so there are certain logical entities which subsist without any reference to human purposes. The relations hold between these entities whether known or unknown; knowing does not alter the character of the entities or the relations which exist between them in any way, shape or manner. Two plus two equals four and the Pythagorean proposition in geometry are true, always have been true and always will be true. The mere discovery of a truth has nothing to do with its being. The being is there quite independent of its being known.

The idealist is unable to know the truth about any one thing because he cannot know the whole truth, know the particular event in its relation to the whole of reality. So interconnected are things in their relation to each other that it is impossible to know all there is to know about any one thing because it is related to every other thing. Consequently, in order to know anything, one must know everything and since he cannot know everything, he cannot know anything. For the realist who believes it possible actually to know things as they are, such a position is simply untenable. He believes that at the basis of this argument there is a fallacy so monstrous as to discredit completely any system which accepts it, viz., that of the internality of relations.² This theory holds that when two terms are related, the terms thus related are modified by virtue of that relation. It may be stated thus: $X \bar{R} Y$. (Let X and Y be the terms to be related while R stands for the relation that exists between them. According to this theory when X is related to Y , both X and Y become

1. Cf. E. B. Holt: *Concept of Consciousness*, Ch. I.
Russell: *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, Lecture II. E. G. Spaulding: *The New Rationalism*, Chs. XXI-XXV inc. W. T. Marvin: *The Emancipation of Metaphysics from epistemology in The New Realism*, pp. 51-60.
2. Cf. *The New Rationalism*, Ch. XXVI.

something other than they originally were by the mere fact of being related. Thus X becomes X_1 and Y becomes Y_1 so that it becomes impossible to know either X as X or Y as Y . Knowledge itself being a relation, it is impossible to know things as they are because the mere act of knowing has brought the object to be known into a new relation, thus altering it from what it was when an object to be known. The object *as known* and the object *to be known* are two quite different objects simply by virtue of the knowing relation involved in the one which is not found in the other.

It is this "constitutive" theory of relations that has given Mr. Bradley so much trouble. He argues the impossibility of relations because one can never reach a relation that is capable of *relating*. Thus in order for R to relate X and Y we must have still another " R " which is capable of relating the relation. After finding such an R we need a relation to relate this relation and so on *ad infinitum*.¹ We may continue indefinitely but we never find a relation that *really* relates. The same difficulty appears when we come to account for the terms to be related. If relations modify their terms, then we should have no simple terms to be related for our terms would be made complex by means of their sustaining relations—granted that such were possible—so that it would be impossible to distinguish the terms from the relations.

Nor does the underlying reality² theory of relations help us any. This is another form which the theory of internal

X R Y.
U

relations may take. It may be stated thus: ———. (X and

Y being the terms to be related while U is the underlying principle by means of which they can be related.) This theory holds that X can only act upon Y through U , *i. e.*, by means of some underlying principle, some common denominator which is able to mediate the relation. But it is only by means of a dogmatic assumption that such a principle is ever found; for if we start with the assumption that X can only act upon Y through U , we may then ask as to the kind of a relation which holds between U and the terms to be related. This can only be answered by means of U_1 , which in turn can only

1. Cf. F. H. Bradley: *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 32, 33.

2. Cf. Spaulding: *The New Rationalism*, pp. 185-90.

relate the $X R Y$ to U by means of a U_2 , and so we may continue *ad infinitum* but never do we reach the underlying principle sought.

To all this the realist says that your difficulties are due to the fact that you have started with a false theory of relations. He comes forward with his theory of the externality of relations, holding that it is quite possible for terms to be related and yet be independent of each other. This principle may be formulated as follows: $X [R] Y$. (Again X and Y are the terms to be related while R stands for the relation.) The brackets indicate that X and Y may be related to one another but that their characters are not changed by virtue of that relation. Relations do not necessarily modify their terms but it is quite possible for terms to be related and still be independent of each other. Relatedness and independence are not incompatible with each other. Entities may pass in and out of relationship with one another without having their essential characteristics thereby modified.

To establish his case, the realist gives as evidence for the externality of relations such instances as that found in the relations between the terms of the number series, any variable and the axioms of geometry and particularly in the case of entities which are related as logical prior and logical subsequent.¹ Thus the points of space are related to one another, but in no sense can be said to be dependent on one another in the sense of a causal dependence; so with any number in the number series, although it occupies a definite and specific position in the serial order, it can hardly be said to be dependent on those numbers which precede or follow it. The relation of logical priority is found when that which is logically subsequent presupposes that which is logically prior, but that which is logically prior does not necessarily imply that which is logically subsequent. Thus motion presupposes both space and time but they do not necessarily imply it; biology presupposes both physics and chemistry but they do not necessarily imply it; and psychology presupposes biology in turn but biology does not necessarily imply psychology. In all these instances we have cases of relatedness and independence. But the most

1. Cf. *The New Rationalism*, pp. 178-82.
Ibid, Ch. XLIII, Sect. VIII-X.

important one of all is that of the knowing relation. By means of the externality of relations it is possible to know things as they really are; it is possible to analyze "in situ" without the character of the object so analyzed being modified. The knowing relation in no way changes its object. Entities may pass in and out of the knowing relation without having their essential characteristics altered in the least.¹ It is by means of this principle of the externality of relations that the realist is able to uphold the independence of knowing and its object.

The above mentioned relation of logical priority is one of very great significance for the realist because of its metaphysical implications. It is by means of this principle that he finds the universe to be logically stratified. The entities, or universals, arrange themselves in a logical hierarchy according to their position in the "neutral mosaic."² Those relations which are most universal and to which all entities conform, naturally occupy the substrata while those entities which do not have such a universal denotation occupy the pinnacle of the structure while between the two extremes may be found entities which occupy any number of intermediate positions. Thus logic and mathematics occupy the seat of honor, they being most fundamental. Sciences which treat of space, time, motion, matter, etc., come next in the series, with probably a number of different combinations or degrees of generality between them. Physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, ethics, politics and sociology occupy their respective places in the hierarchy.³ This relation of logical priority which determines the position of any science in the logical structure, yields a result very similar to Comte's classification of the sciences based upon the degree of positivity, this in turn being determined directly as the generality and inversely as the increasing complexity of the phenomena with which the subject-matter is concerned.* Wherein the realist differs from the positivist is that he is not attempting to reduce all phenomena to mathematical principles as does Comte. Realism admits the existence of non-natural sciences, confining the word "natural" to

1. Cf. *The New Rationalism*, Ch. XLIV.

2. Cf. *Holt: Concept of Consciousness*, Ch. VIII.

3. Prof. Spaulding names the sciences in the following order: Logic, Geometry, Science of time, Kinematics, Dynamics, Pure Mechanics, Applied Mechanics, Physics, Physical Chemistry, Physiology and Psychology. (*Defense of Analysis in New Realism*, p. 205.)

*Comte did not recognize as many sciences.

those which obey a spatial and temporal order. The higher strata of reality can never be deduced from the lower. At each higher level something new appears which is not accounted for by that which has preceded.* The new phenomena must be studied empirically just as those phenomena which occupy a lower level in the structure had to be determined. Thus in the issue between vitalism and mechanism, Prof. Spaulding believes that realism by means of its logical hierarchy is able to show the false antithesis.¹ Life is not merely a combination of physico-chemical atoms as the mechanist claims nor is it something entirely new as the vitalist claims. It is to some extent dependent on physics and chemistry in that it presupposes them but there is also something in addition for which the two aforementioned sciences do not account.

The universe for the realist is truly a Platonic world, a world of universals; entities subsist. So far as knowledge is concerned there may be entities which by definition have no particular instance in the knowledge relation. Such entities would belong to the null class. Thus Russell shows how it is possible to know a general proposition without being able to show a single instance of it. "All the multiplication-sums that never have been and never will be thought of by any human being deal with numbers over 1,000' is obviously a true proposition, although no instance of such a sum can ever be given. It is, therefore, perfectly possible to know that there are propositions we do not know, in spite of the fact that we can give no instance of such a proposition."²

Propositions not only contain our data but they also possess meaning. Meaning is found in the relation of implication which holds between them. We shall now discuss more at length the nature of propositions as presented by Holt and Russell. Anything and everything is an entity; an entity is anything which *is* and since everything is, it is therefore an entity. The only thing that can be said of all entities is that they are. Everything is; being is the most universal of all categories; "it denotes everything and connotes nothing." With respect to the old philosophical dualism of mind and

1. Cf. *The New Realism*, pp. 243-47; also *New Rationalism*, p. 386.

2. Quoted from Perry's *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 318.

*This principle is not original with realism; it is as old as Aristotle and Wundt also makes much use of it.

matter, being is neutral; it is quite outside these universes of discourse.¹ Sticks, stones, trees, horses, cattle, people and governments are all entities, varying only in degrees of complexity and kind.

In order to avoid circular definitions, any system must start with a number of terms which are undefinable. These terms are just given. Such terms are "individual," "class" and "relation," which if definition be attempted, can only be stated in terms of themselves. Mr. Russell would also place the relation of implication² among these logical ultimates. Thus when you say that A is greater than B and B is greater than C, then A is also greater than C, you have an instance of implication. You have not defined the relation but have only given an example of it. When you try to define it, you have already stated it; it is a logical ultimate. Such terms are elementary and it is to the interests of any system to have as few of such undefinables as possible. The more complex terms may then be stated in terms of the simple ones. The relation between the simple and complex terms is that of asymmetry,³ *i. e.*, the inverse of the relation does not hold. Thus the complex entities may be stated in terms of the simple ones but not vice versa.

When entities enter into relation with one another, they form propositions; they, together with the relations which hold between them, form the terms of the propositions. It is the relation between entities that generates propositions, while these in turn, by means of their own "logical" movement, generate systems. The terms are the passive factor, the relations the active factor⁴ and the propositions bear the same relation to a system that the relations bear to a proposition. The movement thus generated is neither spatial nor temporal, neither physical nor mental: it is *logical*.⁵ Once start with the propositions which form the axioms and postulates of any system and the propositions generate their own movement which produces the system. These axioms and postulates correspond to Mr. Russell's "hard" data.⁶ The movement of the propositions

1. Cf. Holt: *Concept of Consciousness*, pp. 1-37.

2. Cf. Russell: *Principles of Mathematics*, pp. 11, 33.

3. Cf. *Concept of Consciousness*, p. 10.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

6. Cf. *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, p. 77 ff.

is strictly logical. Inference is simply a name given to the psychological process of becoming aware of the meanings of the system and the propositions composing that system. The test of any proposition's fitness to be a member of a certain system is its consistency with the other propositions of the system.

To the realist the universe is serial in character. Each of the qualities which a thing possesses may be reduced to its own series.¹ Thus we have a color, an auditory, a temperature, a magnitude series, etc. Any object at any particular moment is simply the resultant of its intersecting series. In this way the world is "de-thingized" and any object is the resultant of the series which happen to be acting upon it for the time being. The entities arrange themselves in a serial order. It is this serial order that generates the movement referred to as logical. Consciousness, too, is such a series. It is the sum total of objects to which the organism is responding at any given moment.² Whether we state it in terms of a relation,³ a dimension,⁴ as a form of energy,⁵ or as a cross-section of the environment,⁶ it occupies a definite position in the neutral hierarchy just as any other entity. Consciousness is simply an *awareness* of the environment to which an organism is responding. Entities pass in and out of this relation just as they pass in and out of any other relation. When in this relation they are known. The relation itself is quite accidental and is by no means a fundamental one. Knowing is simply one relation which an entity may have. The entity is the same when known as when unknown; knowing makes no difference in its essential characteristics. Consciousness is that relation which takes place when the relationship between series produces that state known as awareness.

The foregoing are some of the most substantial pillars which realism employs in erecting its temple of independence. We have dwelt at length upon them in order to show their relation to the original thesis. Merely to have stated that this is the cardinal thesis of realism would hardly have been suffi-

1. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 88 ff.; also *The New Rationalism*, pp. 156 ff.; 169 ff.

2. Cf. Holt: *Concept of Consciousness*, Ch. IX.

3. Cf. Woodbridge in *Carman Memorial Volume*.

4. Cf. Spaulding: *The New Rationalism*, pp. 470-486.

5. Cf. Montague in *Columbia Commemorative Volume to William James*.

6. Cf. Holt: *Concept of Consciousness*.

cient and much less would it have been convincing. It is indeed a magnificent logical structure that marks the last resting place of subjective idealism; it is also a most handsome monument to Bishop Berkeley's genius. The pragmatist, however, refuses to be crushed by the weight of this splendid logical edifice and seriously objects to being buried alongside of the Bishop. And it is quite apparent that the pragmatist is still very much alive for we are hearing vehement protests against such a burial on the grounds that the structure has not fallen on his shoulders for the realist, alas! in his endeavor to refute subjectivism has quite overlooked the importance of *meaning* and it is not a world of mere existence in which the pragmatist is interested but one of meaning. Unless the realist can defend his position at the point of meaning the pragmatist cannot go with him. Meanings, too, must be quite independent of human purposes and problems. We shall now see how the realist attempts to defend his position at this point.

The mind of course has no part to play in the determining of meanings if the realist is consistent. This is exactly what he attempts to establish. The relations hold between entities and propositions regardless of whether or not they ever come into the knowing relation. The meanings are just there, there to be discovered when one observes them. The mind is a spectator which simply beholds the implications of propositions; propositions are entirely objective and imply one another through their own logical movement. The mind is purely passive; it simply becomes aware of the movement of the system. Mr. Russell finds it wholly as passive in inference as in an ordinary act of perception.¹ Propositions imply one another. Implication is a relation which holds between propositions. Inference is simply the psychological process of becoming aware of the implications which hold between propositions. Since for Russell, all induction is a form of deduction because the principle of induction itself presupposes deduction, all inference is deductive.² Mr. Russell later sees the difficulty with this spectator attitude toward life and confesses that judgment cannot simply be "the apprehension of

1. Principles of Mathematics, p. 33.

2. Cf. Problems of Philosophy, Ch. VI.

a fact" for this would give no account of error.¹ He therefore makes it consist of a relation of at least three terms, a point which we shall discuss later. It is only when we come to truth and error that this mere apprehending relation is openly discarded by Russell although some inconsistent statements have paved the way for its graceful dismissal. Both Montague and Russell are forced to alternate between two contradictory positions⁴ but refuse to recognize the insufficiency of the role of the spectator. Prof. Perry is not a good realist at this point for he quite frankly admits that both meaning and value are types of dependent relations.² Prof. Woodbridge's realism also fails him here for he holds that consciousness is a relation of meaning.³ Even Mr. Russell is now not quite so sure as he once was that "good and bad are properties of things just as round and square are."⁴

Both Russell and Spaulding find the old logic very inadequate because it fails to take account of relations other than a subject-predicate kind. The latter contends that it was developed from the Greek conception of thing⁵ and consequently takes into account only such relations as one gets from the substance-attribute relation. It, therefore, needs to be supplemented by the relations which a logico built around the conception of order can supply. Relations so considered may be classified as to symmetry, transitivity and as to the number of terms employed in the relation.⁶ The examples of the implicative situation cited by Prof. Spaulding are of these types. Thus, A is father of B implies that B is child of A. (One cannot here say "son-of" for the implication may also be "daughter-of," the relation being of the "one-many" type.) If A is to the left of B then B must be to the right of A. The relation here involved is one of asymmetry, not being identical with its inverse. A is similar to B implies that B is similar to A. Here we have an instance in which the relation involved in the implication is symmetrical as we would also have in the case of equality.

1. Scientific Method in Philosophy, p. 58.

2. Cf. A Realistic Theory of Independence in The New Realism, pp. 140-44.

3. Cf. Carman Memorial Volume.

4. Preface to Mysticism and Logic.

5. Cf. The New Rationalism, pp. 29-36.

6. Cf. Royce's essay in Enc. Phil. Sc. Vol. II, Sec. 2.

Any fact may express itself through a proposition. When anything has a certain quality or a certain relation it is a fact. The fact is objective and independent of any assertion made about it. If I say that "the book is red" the assertion involves the attributing of a certain quality to a certain object. Whether or not the book has this quality is a fact which has nothing to do with my judgment in regard to it. Mr. Russell says:

"Given any fact, there is an assertion which expresses the fact. The fact itself is objective, and independent of our thought or opinion about it; but the assertion is something which involves thought, and may be either true or false. . . . A *form of words** which must be either true or false I shall call a *proposition*. Thus a proposition is the same as what may significantly be asserted or denied. A proposition which expresses what we have called a fact, *i. e.*, which when asserted, asserts that a certain thing has a certain quality, or that certain things have a certain relation, will be called an atomic proposition."¹

Besides the "atomic" we also have "molecular" and "general" propositions. It is the molecular type in which we are primarily interested as it is this type that gives rise to the relation of implication, thus making inference possible. In spite of symbolic logic's claims for newness, this molecular type of proposition seems only a new way of saying "hypothetical," while our so-called "atomic" propositions are only a new way for saying "categorical." The general proposition which is the most perfect because of its purely "formal" character, turns out to be our old friend the syllogism wearing a new coat. It may be stated as follows: "If anything has a certain property, and whatever has this property has a certain other property, then the thing in question has the other property."² This is a highly general proposition and is purely formal in character. The interesting thing about it is that even in the syllogism we find the relations both of asymmetry and transitivity, for the discovery of which the symbolic logician takes great pride in his originality.

If knowledge is to be gained by the kind of inference that

1. Scientific Method in Philosophy, p. 52.

2. Ibid, p. 57.

*Italics mine.

is represented in our molecular propositions, then we may as well give up in despair. Suppose I tell you that if I study I shall have my lesson. From this how are you to know whether or not I am going to have my lesson. By the implication, of course, says Mr. Russell. It does not inform you as to whether or not I am going to study, but *if I do study*, I shall have my lesson. The form is perfect and if you know the proposition and its logical movement you have all the information that is needed provided I do my part and study my lesson. But how does this compare with what may actually happen? Perhaps I have tried to deceive you, or granted my truthfulness, the lesson may be more difficult than expected and despite special effort on my part it is not mastered. The illustration simply shows the futility of inference in leading to truth when the implication is purely formal.

Propositions constitute data as well as meaning for the realist. Mr. Russell classifies data as to their logical and psychological primitive or derivative character. The classes may take any possible combinations such as those data which are psychologically primitive but logically derivative or vice versa, etc.² A primitive belief, either logical or psychological, is one which we hold independent of other beliefs; it does not rest for its validity upon the acceptance or rejection of some other belief. Thus we believe that the things we see in perception do not depend upon our seeing them for their existence, but that they exist whether or not we happen to be looking at them. This belief is logically primitive in that it is not derived from any other belief but is psychologically derivative in that it depends upon previously having had experiences which justify the belief. Contrawise, the things of which we are not aware we believe to exist not because of previous experience and other beliefs. Hence it is a psychologically primitive belief. "Our data are now primarily the facts of sense (*i. e.*, of *our own* sense-data) and the laws of logic."³

It is hardly correct to speak of implication and inference at one end of the process and truth and error at the other for there seems to be no process involved in symbolic logic.

1. Cf. *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, p. 54 ff.

2. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-72.

3. *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, p. 72.

Knowledge is simply a matter of beholding propositions and these propositions are either true or false. How it is possible for such a thing as a false proposition to be exhibited is for most of us a mystery, but the realist has a method of accounting for error. It is a method but as to how well it succeeds we shall judge later.

One of the ways in which the realist accounts for error is well illustrated by Dr. Montague's "epistemological triangle."¹ In this triangle we have (1) the actual existing external object, (2) the cerebral state itself and (3) the object perceived or apprehended. Error may arise in either of two ways. It may be due to the energy arising from the object being distorted either at the physical or psychical medium of transmission. The former gives rise to errors of perception while the latter gives rise to those of inference.² These two types of error are not mutually exclusive for it makes little difference whether we say that the senses have reported incorrectly, or whether we infer a wrong relation in the spatio-temporal-qualitative order. In either case the error is real and objective. The classic illustrations of the rails appearing to converge at a distance as one looks up the track and the straight stick appearing as bent when thrust obliquely into water and reflected through that medium are cases in point. These illusions are real and have just as much validity as a true perception. When the stick appears bent the relational complex which is observed is a real complex and is not merely a subjective illusion; it is quite as objective as when the same stick appears to be straight when in some other relation.

Just as there are two ways in which error may arise, so there are two ways by which truth may occur. It may be due either to a correct presentation of the object so that the object as known corresponds with the object to be known, or to the corrective function of inference upon a distorted complex so that the object is known as it really is. When an object is perceived as it really is the energy at the third angle of the triangle is the same as that at the first; it has not been modified by the transmitting media. In the case where the rails are known to be parallel, inference has corrected the error

1. Cf. *A Realistic Theory of Truth and Error in The New Realism*, p. 286.

2. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 289 ff.

that would otherwise have been inevitable had the object been judged by its visual appearance. This is all very well but how could such a passive psychological process as inference ever perform a corrective function? It will be remembered that inference is simply a matter of becoming aware of objective implications. Here Doctor Montague is evidently introducing a new conception of inference. Furthermore, he must have forgotten that in the knowing process we have an instance of the externality of relations. This being the case, how is it possible for the spatio-temporal-qualitative order to be modified at either medium of our epistemological triangle? Objects should always be presented as they are if the theory of external relations is to hold universally of the knowing process. In order to account for error the realist has evidently abandoned one of his favorite offsprings, the theory of the externality of the knowledge relation.

Prof. Holt would make contradiction the essential characteristic of error. He takes particular pains to point out that contradictions appear in propositions as over against the conception of a contradiction in terms. Following Russell, he holds that the latter is "either false or meaningless."¹ In order to have a contradiction in terms, *being* must be denied but such a denial is meaningless for *everything is*. When propositions contradict each other we have error. The result of this conception is that error seems to be about all there is in the world for "Nature is a seething chaos of contradiction."

"All collisions between bodies, all interference between² energies, all processes of warming and cooling, of electrically charging and discharging, of starting and stopping, of combining and separating, are processes of which one undoes the other. And they cannot be defined by the scientist except in propositions which manifestly contradict one another. All nature is so full of these mutually negative processes that we are moved to admiration when a few forces co-operate long enough to form what we call an organism; and even then *decay sets in forthwith*."

How absurd to speak of such contradictions as cases of error! Yet this is what the logic demands. The natural neces-

1. *Concept of Consciousness*, pp. 262, 3.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 275.

sity of the physical world, when generalized, becomes the logical necessity of the neutral realm. Contradictory propositions are the occasion for error. These appear in the objective world as well as in the subjective; error is not *merely* subjective. Objective error is real for contradictory propositions appear in the world of nature. Prof. Holt recognizes both subjective and objective error but seems partial to the neutral order.¹

Prof. Spaulding finds no difficulty in accounting for error. He disposes of the problem—which to him is not a problem at all of course—by relegating it to the world of subsistence.² By placing error in this realm it may still be just as real and just as objective as one could possibly desire to have it. In the case of error the person judging has merely mistaken a *subsistent* for an *existent*. Both subsistents and existents are equally real.³ All entities subsist whereas some only exist. Some only exist at certain times and certain places while there are others which may never attain the specific correlation which is characteristic of existent entities. An example of the latter would be that of the “null class,” a class which has no particular instance. The illustration cited above from Russell is such an example. If a man should mistake his friend for a post through the dense fog and he were very anxious to see his friend at this particular time, it would indeed be consoling to him to know that the post merely subsisted in this particular relational situation whereas his friend had actually been an existent in the complex. Both the friend and the post are equally real but the post only subsisted while the friend existed. Prof. Spaulding says:

“*Between the knowing of that state of affairs which the theory⁴ describes and the (subsistential) entities of which this state of affairs holds, there is a relation of correspondence. If, now, one takes these entities to be also existential, and they are not, one is in error. On the other hand, if they are existential, then there is not only a correspondence between the knowing process and the subsistents, but also between the subsistents and the existents, as well as between the existents*

1. Cf. *Concept of Consciousness*, Ch. XIII.

2. Cf. *The New Rationalism*, p. 293 ff.; p. 429; p. 376 ff.

3. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 494.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

and the knowing. But, *because that which one takes to exist does not exist, is no ground for making it subjective.* Rather, if such an entity finds its place in a consistent and implicative theory, then, although not existential, it is *subsistential, and as objective as any existential entity.*"

Mr. Russell, although he finds it not at all logically refutable to uphold the position of objective falsehood, prefers not to do so if he can possibly avoid it and has rather an ingenious way of solving the problem. He grasps the problem at its roots when he makes an analysis of the kind of relation presented by every judgmental situation.¹ The difficulty with previous correspondence theories has been that they have conceived of judgment as a two term relation, whereas the fact of the matter is that it is always at least a three term relation, consisting in a relation of the mind to several other terms. If all judgments were true there would be no difficulty in conceiving of it as a two term relation, viz., that of a mind apprehending a fact. But since all judgments are not true, we must either consider judgment a relation of more than two terms or admit the possibility of objective falsehoods. We have seen that Professors Holt, Spaulding and Montague have chosen the latter alternative but Mr. Russell gives quite a different statement.

Without judgments and beliefs there would be no such thing as truth and error and yet the truth of a proposition is in no sense dependent upon a judgment in regard to it. In the one case, truth and falsity are properties of belief and in the other they are properties of propositions. If A kills B because of C the relation holds whether or not there is a judgment in regard to it. Here we have a proposition that is either true or false. Your judgment or my judgment or anybody else's judgment does not affect the truth of the proposition either one way or the other. The complex of A's killing B because of C is a fact which simply is. When a person judges this relational complex so that the same relation expressed in the judgment actually holds between the terms of the proposition judged, the judgment is a true one; if the relation judged does not hold between the terms, the judgment is false. Mr. Russell's own statement is as follows:

1. Cf. *Philosophical Essays*, Essay VII.

"Every judgment is a relation of the mind to several objects, one of which is a relation; the judgment is *true* when the relation which is one of the objects relates the other objects, otherwise it is false."¹ And again, "Judgment is a relation of the mind to several other terms; when these other terms have *inter se* a "corresponding" relation, the judgment is true; when not, it is false."² Thus, in the above statement if I judge that A killed C because of B my judgment is false because there is not a correspondence of the relation "killed" with that which holds in the terms of the proposition judged.

We have seen that the theory of external relations, Platonic realism which gives a dual world of subsistence and existence, epistemological monism whereby it is possible for the object itself to be directly presented in an act of knowledge and the various statements of consciousness, whether it be that of the relational, the dimensional or the energistic type, are all tools by means of which the realist defends his original thesis of the independence of being and knowing. The position holds as over against Berkeleyan idealism. Whether or not the same may be said for it when meanings are involved is quite another question and one which we shall discuss at another point. The realist has, however, attempted to defend his position at this point in the manner already indicated. The meanings, both in the form of implication and truth, are simply there for one who will look and behold them. Truth is merely a matter of becoming aware of the right implications which hold between propositions while error is failure to apprehend successfully the correct relations between such propositions.

The foregoing is a statement of the general realistic position in regard to meaning. Let us now pass on to a similar study of the pragmatic conception of meaning.

1. Philosophical Essays, p. 181.

2. Ibid. p. 178.

CHAPTER III.

Pragmatism and Meaning

Coming now to pragmatism, the center of interest is shifted somewhat from that which we noted in the previous chapter. Instead of attending so much to the scenery, we are now primarily interested in the actors themselves. Man is no longer viewed as a spectator watching the events of an alien world but is himself a participant in those events. The stage is not already constructed for him but he is himself constantly building the stage so that it better serves his purposes, ministers to his needs and satisfies his interests and desires.

We had occasion to note in our first chapter that in its early days, pragmatism concerned itself with combating various species of absolutism, particularly centering its polemic about the truth question. The pragmatist, priding himself upon his interest in humanity, quite rightly noted that the *raison d'être* for any philosophy ultimately rests upon its ability to serve human beings by enabling them to discriminate the true from the false; translated into ethical terms, it must give them a working criterion for distinguishing the right from the wrong. This, absolute idealism had failed to do and it was the pragmatist who summoned the representatives of this philosophy to court. In that chapter it was also pointed out that the pragmatist faced his opponents by upholding the thesis of "the relativity of truth." That instrumentalism, which now more nearly represents the pragmatic position, is an outgrowth of the controversy and is the main tool which the pragmatist has employed in defending his counter-thesis, we are now about to establish.

So long as we are interested in the "Whole of Reality" and do not care about the meaning of the world in which we live, we can get along very nicely with absolute truths and absolute goods, but the minute we attempt to put any content into these values, the abstract ideal of Truth proves only an empty husk in which we may dwell, provided we wish to die before our bodily processes cease; but if we want to live we

cannot dwell in such a husk but must come out into the world of meanings, of happenings where things are taking place. Whether we like it or no, constituted as we are, we are compelled to live in the latter kind of world. If our philosophy is to justify itself, it must enable us to get around in the kind of a world in which we live; it must apply to our world, a world of change and of happenings and not to some fixed and ready-made, completed, ideal world.

All this the pragmatist sees and consequently shapes his philosophy accordingly. He offers us a statement of truth that will apply to our world. He readily sees that if truth is to have any meaning, it can only be as it is related to some human purpose or enterprise. Taken by itself it is only so much verbiage; when we find it it is always connected with some problem of some particular individual or individuals. It is not something that is floating around in the air for which we may grab as we would for a piece of bread when hungry, but represents the status of a logical situation. Truth and falsity are relative to conditions and circumstances, these being determined by the needs of the problem under investigation.

When we examine the nature of truth we find that it is not a finished product but that it always appears as it is related to a given situation; we never find The Truth but meet with specific truths in the course of our experience. Truths are continually being made with the growth and diversification of experience. If then, says the pragmatist, we want to know when a thing is true and when false, we must place it in experience, must find out what kind of experience we have when we designate certain things as true and others false. It is here that his instrumentalism comes in, for in the process of analysis, we find that the distinction between true and false arises when we recognize the instrumental character of our thinking. We may search for Absolute Truth and take delight in an independent thought but the minute we attempt to put any meaning into our terms, we find that truth is specific and that thinking is instrumental; it is adaptive and purposeful and aids us in perfecting a more satisfactory adjustment between ourselves and our environment.

It is one thing to show that a thing may be true in one situation and false in another or that a certain line of conduct may be right in a given situation and wrong in another and reject absolutism upon this basis; but it is quite another thing to point out the reasons for its being thus. True enough, we do refer to the problem in hand when we demonstrate the facts but it is still another step to arrive at the instrumental character of thought. When we meet with concrete instances of conduct which we call "right" or see facts which we call "true," these adjectives always apply to situations where human activity is involved. The natural thing to do would be to connect these adjectives with situations in which human purposes are involved but instead the absolutist asks us to cling to a truth that is just given and a thought that just thinks. We cannot apply it in life but there still is a Truth that is just true and a thought *an sich* whose business it is to match an external and independent world. Once recognize the adaptive character of consciousness and the instrumental nature of thought and we shall no longer stand in need of absolute truths and absolute rights. These the pragmatist frankly admits and with such recognition, we shall now see how he is able to introduce meaning into his world.

We start with an organism that is adjusting itself to an environment; nor is it purely a matter of adjusting itself but is equally a matter of adjusting the environment to itself. The principle works both ways; there is a constant interaction between organism and environment. In the course of this process difficulties arise;¹ the organism is obstructed in its activity; its desires have not been fulfilled satisfactorily. Consequently if action is to continue the situation must be reconstructed, either to enable it to continue in the line in which it has been inhibited or to turn it into an equally desirable channel, one which will satisfy the needs of the organism. It may be food, shelter or clothing that is demanded and if these are not forthcoming from the environment at hand, it is up to the individual to reconstruct the situation in such manner that the desire may be satisfied. Could all desires be satisfied without effort on our part, we should be living in a

1. Cf. Dewey: "Reflex Arc Conquest in Psychology." Psych. Rev. Vol. III, p. 357; also Journal of Phil., Psych. and Sc. Methods, Vol. IV, pp. 664 ff.

world in which individuals respond directly to presented stimuli and one in which thinking *as such* would not take place.

So long as the method of responding directly to stimuli is effective, there is no occasion for thinking. It is because this method often brings undesirable consequences that thought is provoked in order that more satisfactory results may be obtained in the future. This is only another way of saying that "necessity is the mother of invention." As the rudimentary desires are satisfied, either by instinct or through the mediation of thought, our interests become broader and our desires increase so that if our needs are all to be satisfied, intelligence must again intervene. At each stage of the process thought becomes free to reconstruct its own ends; wants that were once a luxury become necessities. Thus railroads, telegraphs, telephones, electric lights, steam heat, etc., were all once luxuries but have now become necessities. The term "practical" interest or "practical" need is therefore relative to individual development and social culture. When the pragmatist maintains that reflection grows out of a "practical" situation he does not mean that it is purely a matter of securing bread and butter as so many have interpreted him to mean. That necessity is the mother of invention is only half of the story; it is equally as true that "invention is the mother of necessity."

Whatever else the nature of the practical situation in which thinking arises may be, it is always a problematic situation.¹ By such a situation we mean one in which action has been inhibited and desire cannot be satisfied directly but only by means of a reconstruction of the situation; it is a situation that involves *wants*. The meaning is ambiguous so that the individual does not know what line of conduct will prove most fruitful in bringing about the desired reconstruction. The data present conflicting meanings. If the meaning of the facts were perfectly obvious, we should have no problem at all but should react directly to the stimulus presented. It is the conflict of meanings, the doubt as to what course is most wise to pursue that gives rise to the problem.

The problem always involves the experience of an individual; it arises in his experience.² It is his interest, his

1. Cf. Dewey: *Essays in Experimental Logic*, Ch. III.

2. Cf. G. H. Mead: *Scientific Method and Individual Thinker in Creative Intelligence*.

desire, his experience that calls for a reconstruction of the situation. Other individuals may or may not have had a similar experience. This does not alter the fact that the present situation—the one in which the problem appears—involves his experience. Just what the experience means he does not know; it is an anomaly for him. It therefore commands his attention that he may be able to interpret it properly. If he can find out what it means this time, he will have more data from which he may infer probable consequences in future situations or may be of assistance to others in similar situations. The experience is his; it is his own private problem. Although the problem is his it is also a social matter. It had its birth under social conditions for the individual in whose experience it has appeared, is not an isolated individual but is a social individual. He is living in a society and it was out of this social environment that the problem arose. The thought that he employs for the solution of the problem is social in character; he is dependent upon society for many of his meanings and interpretations. The problem, although private, is not private in the sense of belonging to a purely private and entirely independent individual. It is private in the sense that it is *his* but he himself is a part of society. The individual may go to others for its solution but the problem itself is a product of the individual's experience. The problem arises within the experience of the individual but his experience is a social experience.

It is the unique character of the experience in which the individual figures that enables us to account for the exception, and it is the exception in which modern science is primarily interested. Here we find a striking difference between modern and ancient science. The traditional logic had no place for the exception. It was treated as a "freak" or an anomaly in nature and was a fit subject of interest only as a curiosity. The exception afforded difficulties with the Aristotelian scheme of things; it could not comfortably be placed under a universal and consequently had no recognized standing among respectable thinkers. The present-day scientist is not only tolerant of exceptions but takes great delight in their discovery. He gives them a warm welcome and feels quite at home while in their company. In short, it is the exception

from which modern science gets its cue; science starts with the exception. It is the exception that sets the problem and science thrives on problems.

The problem does not present an absolutely new experience. If it did, there would be no meaning whatever in the experience, and as such, it would not constitute a problem. It might then be a puzzle but not a problem. The exception is not entirely new; it is novel, *i. e.*, it presents something that is old together with something that is new. It is relatively new but not wholly so. The old saying that "there is nothing new under the sun" is true or false according to the way in which we interpret the word "new." If we mean by it that nothing new ever happens, it is false, but if we mean that the new is never entirely new it is quite true. This is quite in accordance with the demands of a problem which require a conflict in the meanings of the data. An absolutely new experience would not fulfill this requirement; it would not present a conflict of meanings but would afford no meaning at all; it would be meaningless.

A correct statement of the nature of a problem enables us to solve the old Socratic mystery of how it is possible to know anything new. Socrates argued that it would be impossible to know anything new because we either would know it or we would not know it; if we knew it, it would not be new, while, if we did not know it, we should have no way of knowing it and consequently could not know it. This paradoxical situation forced Plato to resort to his eternal ideas of which we had knowledge in some previous existence and which we may recognize in this world as they embody themselves in the particulars of sense and individual experiences. Plato could not account for knowledge upon any other basis, but had he recognized the problematic character of knowledge, the difficulty would have disappeared and he would not have had to resort to his archetypal ideas in order to account for the possibility of knowledge.

Taking Socrates' own statement of the case, the situation is even more hopeless than he had pictured it for upon that basis it not only would be impossible to know anything new but would be equally impossible to have any kind of knowledge,

for it would be quite impossible for knowledge to get a start in the first place. We should have to endow our individuals with some knowledge, otherwise they would never know anything. But our troubles vanish when we recognize the fact that every knowing situation involves both knowledge and ignorance; there is something of the old and something of the new involved. Some facts are not questioned while the meaning of others is doubtful. It is this doubtful character of the situation that renders it a knowledge situation; every knowledge situation is therefore a problematic situation; its meaning is ambiguous; it involves both the old and the new, the experienced and the novel. This statement of the problem not only enables us to account for new knowledge (it is hardly correct to use the term for knowledge always involves something of the new element in it), but also enables us to show how knowledge gets started. It does not involve previous knowledge but it does involve previous experience. Knowledge presupposes experience but experience does not necessarily involve knowledge. Knowledge arises out of a conflict in experience, the conflict being eliminated through the mediation of intelligence. Experience is a broader term than knowledge. Not all experience contains knowledge but all knowledge does involve experience. This view of the relationship between knowledge and experience is consistent with a psychological account of knowledge. The "big, blooming, buzzing confusion" which the infant experiences does not afford meaning but it is out of just such experiences that knowledge evolves. Angell thinks that even this classic statement of James' gives the infant credit for a greater power of discrimination than he deserves.

The exception, which is the source of the conflict, calls for interpretation; its meaning must be discovered in order that action may continue. It can only be interpreted in the light of previous experience. This is the reason that an absolutely new experience is unintelligible. The individual has no clue as to the proper interpretation. The experience remains an enigma until he is able to bring something out of his experience to bear upon the situation. The experiences which he summons for this purpose constitute the data for his problem. They offer suggestions as to possible meanings. The pain may be a trivial matter or it may be something that

demands expert treatment at once. The individual consults a physician for he has at his command a more specialized experience. His diagnosis stands a greater possibility of being correct. He pronounces it an attack of appendicitis. The meaning for the physician is apparent whereas for the patient it was ambiguous. But it has not always been clear to the physician—and for some it is not so yet—but has only become so by means of careful inquiry. Suppose that the case were not so easily diagnosed and that it constituted an exception in the experience of the physician. He might analyze it to his best ability or consult one whose experience is broader and who consequently has more data for a more satisfactory diagnosis. If the proper inferences are drawn, and the patient recovers, the case is then confirmatory evidence of a correct diagnosis. It may be used as data for the diagnoses of similar cases in the future.

The distinction between data and meaning is a functional one; it is due to the temporal character of the judgment.¹ A judgment is not a static proposition; it is an active process. ("Active" is superfluous for all processes are active.) A judgment is a living affair. It does not represent a dead situation but is made with reference to future conduct. A dead judgment is no judgment at all. All judgments are alive; they represent an incomplete situation;² they stand for a goal not yet attained. There is something at stake in a judgment; there is a problem to be solved, an end to be achieved, an ideal as yet unrealized. It is this doubtful element in the judgment that involves a temporal process. Were judgment a mere observation, a ready-made perception, the temporal element would not be necessary. But judgment is not perception; a judgment may start with a perception but neither the act of perceiving nor the thing perceived constitutes the judgment. Perceptions form the data, the subject of the judgment but do not constitute a judgment. If we knew the meaning of a percept, we should not judge about it; we should act with reference to it. It is the doubtful meaning that makes a judgment a temporal process.

The data set the problem while the meaning offers a solu-

1. Cf. Dewey: *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pages 1 to 8.

2. Cf. *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 337 ff.

tion; the former form the subject, the latter the predicate of any judgment. The data represent that part of the situation which is not questioned while the predicate stands for the doubtful part of the situation. In every judgmental situation there are certain facts which are not questioned and certain facts which are questioned. (Here again, it is not technically correct to speak of "facts being questioned.") A fact which is questioned is no longer a fact; it becomes a *meaning*. In order for a fact to be a fact its meaning must not be questioned. A fact is a fact only when it functions as such, *i. e.*, when its meaning is not questioned.¹ the pain is a fact. As such it is not questioned; it is a datum and constitutes the subject of a judgment about the fact. Its triviality or its severity are possible meanings; they are hypotheses formed with reference to future action concerning the pain. They stand for the doubtful or problematic character of the situation, are meanings and form the predicate of a judgment.

The facts are not just given; they represent the results of previous inquiries. They are data which may be brought to bear upon a given situation. They are past experiences which seem most significant for purposes of inference; they suggest meanings. The meanings are not fixed, absolute entities. They are suggestions or ideas, hypotheses upon which we may act. They point toward the completed situation; they indicate a line of action. When a meaning is verified it is no longer a meaning. It becomes a fact and remains in that status until again questioned and is proved false. Facts become ideas and ideas become facts. A fact is not always a fact, neither is an idea always an idea. A thing is either fact or idea according to the manner in which it functions in a judgment. The process of judging involves a constant oscillation between fact and idea or data and meaning. This is a process through which reality is being made. Our world is constantly being reconstructed by means of the judging process. The process of going from data to meaning and back to data again, the process which constitutes a complete act of thought, is not the only way of reshaping the world and reorganizing society. It is the most effective way; it is the *intelligent* method for progress.

1. Cf. *Essays in Experimental Logic*, Ch. IV.

An idea is a meaning; it is not an image of reality but a sign for the bringing about of a reality. It is not a picture of a finished situation but an indicator of a future experience. It is a guide, an index to a line of conduct which will prove most fruitful in reconstructing a given situation. The hypothesis¹ is formed with reference to the solution of the problem. It is that idea which seems most significant, which appears as having the greatest probability of bringing about the desired situation. The hypothesis is that meaning that can give the best account of itself, has most in its favor and looks best. It is one that past experience leads one to think may be trusted; it not only stands square on the books but has a balance in its favor. The idea that becomes the hypothesis can get credit; it has a respectable standing in the community which constitutes our problematic situation.

A meaning is a sign, an index; it points toward that which we should expect to find should we act upon its suggestion. The logical value of an idea is its carrying power, *i. e.* its ability to lead to a desirable conclusion. When an idea properly performs this function, it is called a "true" idea. It is true because it does the work that it was intended to do. When it fails as a guide, it is false; it will not produce the consequences which the situation demands for a satisfactory solution. Ideas, as such, are neither true nor false; they become such according to the way they work within a given situation.

When we use such terms as "satisfy," "work," "fulfill desires," "meet a need," "bring us what we want," etc., we must bear in mind that they are always with reference to the problem at hand. It is not a question as to whether or not they bring a certain amount of emotional satisfaction or bring you what you might like to have. Thus if you are ill and learn that you have an incurable disease, there is nothing very satisfying about it unless you happen to be one of those who takes great delight in being ill. Your problem was not that of finding something satisfying in general but that of learning the nature of your illness. The disease, no matter how painful it may be to you, satisfies the demands of the problem. It is in this sense that an idea is true and not in some silly, senti-

1. Cf. *ibid.*, Ch. VIII.

mental satisfaction as some of the critics of pragmatism have claimed.

A recent international situation presents an illustration of the manner in which ideas work. The peace treaty was a hypothesis. Judging by the severity of its exactions, it was formulated for the purpose of crushing Germany. If this had been the aim of the war, such a treaty might have been desirable. If carried out it probably would lead to that end. On the other hand, if our aim was to bring about a moral standard among nations and effect a treaty that would assure us of a permanent peace, its desirability is more doubtful. The desirability of the treaty, the truth or falsity of the hypotheses involved in it depended upon whether or not we wished to continue to live in a nationalistic jungle or whether we preferred to move on to a civilized internationalism. If we desired peace but acted upon some of the hypotheses expressed in the treaty, the ideas were likely to prove false. Past experience should have told us that we had not selected significant ideas for our purpose. If we wanted revenge the terms were very satisfying but if we were working for a new era, they were not the ones we should have wanted. Those who were moved by hatred might have been willing to admit that less stringent demands would have been better for bringing about an *effective* League of Nations and yet not have found quite the amount of emotional satisfaction that they did in the actual terms. Their amount of mere emotional satisfaction would have depended upon their desire for revenge on the one hand and their enthusiasm for a new state of affairs on the other. It would not have affected the truth or falsity of the ideas expressed in the treaty in the least. Their truth or falsity was with reference to their ability to lead to a *better* situation, provided that was what he wanted.

When an hypothesis is acted upon and brings you what you want, it is no longer an idea but becomes a fact. In every problematic situation our meanings are ambiguous. There is an hypothesis on trial, a meaning that is doubtful, a fact that is questioned. If this were not the case we should have no problem at all but should simply be living in a world and conduct would take place without thinking. As Prof. Mead happily expressed it. "We should lose our minds if it were not

for our problems." Mind appears when there is a problem to be solved.¹ Those who are about to give up in despair because of their problems may find some consolation in this viewpoint. A practical illustration is familiar to all. We need only observe one who has lost all ambition and who is perfectly satisfied with his lot and existence. He has no aspirations and consequently no problems to be solved; he has no occasion for thinking. His brain is proportionately small—so far as appearances are concerned at any rate and appearance seems to be worth more than reality in this case. Physiologically the brain may be of normal size but unless it functions in the inferential capacity, we are quite right in saying that "he has no mind."* In order for a mind to be a mind it must function as such; it must infer meanings; it must respond to problematic situations.

With a number of ideas before us, our problem becomes that of selecting or finding out what meanings are most significant for our purpose. The problem itself suggests the meanings; the purpose of the individual in whose experience the problem arises will determine what ideas will be suggested.² If we all had the same experiences, certain meanings would be no more significant to one than to another. It is because our experience is limited that we consult a physician or seek advice from the specialist. These people have at their command a system of meanings from which they may select those which previous experience in similar situations leads them to believe will prove most useful in the solution of the problem. The expert has had more experience with problems which come within his work; he stands a greater probability of selecting the most significant meanings. A science is an organized system of meanings for purposes of control. It has selected those meanings which have proved most useful in guiding conduct with reference to the problems in which it is especially interested; it may, whenever the occasion demands, bring to bear this organized body of knowledge as data upon any problematic situation which happens to confront it.

1. Cf. C. H. Mead: *Definition of the Psychical* in *University of Chicago Decennial Publications*.

2. Cf. Dewey; *How We Think*. Ch. IX.

*The discussion refers to logical mind as vs. other aspects of mind.

In order to determine the hypothesis which is likely to be most useful, we must bring sufficient data to bear upon the problem. The willingness to do this as over against the attitude of the individual who never goes beyond his own nose, determines whether or not the attitude is scientific. The patience of the scientist in collecting and examining his data has become almost proverbial. The expert is he who is scientific in his attitude toward a problem. Compare the patience of a Darwin or a Newton who would not make their generalizations until they had collected a tremendous body of evidence with a "Peace Conference" which assembled and refused to hear the other side's viewpoint. It did not seek sufficient data to offer satisfactory solutions of the problems before it. Their inferences could only be drawn from a very limited amount of data. In excluding the vanquished from the conference they had willfully restricted their data and yet posed as experts!* The meanings they placed in the treaty may have been significant from the data they had before them but in arbitrarily restricting their data they had precluded the possibility of reaching the most significant hypotheses for a satisfactory solution of the problems before them.

As another illustration of how ideas must work¹ in order to be true, let us take the case of the small boy who has lost his cap. He knows he had it when he was in the house and insists that it must be some place in there. He searches from cellar to garret but fails to find his cap. He gives up the quest as a "bad job" but later accidentally stumbles upon his cap while playing in the back yard. He has found the object for which he was looking but it has not been because of acting upon the idea which he thought would bring him the results that he was after. The finding takes place outside of a logical situation. The hypothesis upon which he acted was false because it did not lead him to his cap. Suppose, however, that he believes he left it in the dining room but finds it in the pantry; his idea would be false unless he abandons the dining-room hypothesis in favor of the pantry one in the course of his search and is acting upon that idea when he finds his cap; in

1. Cf. *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, Ch. V.

*The writer holds Mr. Wilson in no way responsible for this situation. In fact, he is of the opinion that the treaty would have been still blacker in its contour had it not been for the President's presence at the conference.

this case the idea is true. The illustration in the latter instance would also show the abandonment of one hypothesis in favor of another.

When an idea does lead to the satisfactory solution of a problem, there is a correspondence of fact and idea. This correspondence, however, is not a structural but a functional one; it is not a correspondence of an objective fact with a subjective idea but is the kind of a correspondence that takes place when the idea brings us into the presence of the object which we believed it would when we acted upon that idea. It is not a pictorial but a practical correspondence that takes place. The idea does not represent a reality; it leads to a reality. It is not an image of an objective world but a tool for the purpose of guiding conduct; it is not a mere subjective state but an instrument of control.

Thus far in our discussion we have been considering only the meaning of ideas. Let us now see what we mean by the meaning of an object. An object has meaning for us as we respond to it; we see objects in terms of response. Each object has a mode of response for us and we get meaning out of it in so far as we can respond to it. Tables, chairs, pencils, books, caps, clothing and people all have a definite meaning for us because we recognize a familiar mode of response in them. We see each in terms of the motor reactions we make with reference to them. We react differently towards a cow than we do towards an automobile. The difference in the meaning of the two objects is in the kind of reactions we make with reference to them.

If we always knew how to respond to an object we should have no problems. It is because we do not know how to react to an object, how to respond to a certain situation that gives rise to the problem. We do not know what kind of conduct to pursue with reference to the object; we are in doubt as to how to respond to it. Hence its meaning is not clear. A thing has no meaning because we have no experience which interprets it, at least for the time being. It begins to have meaning when we detect somewhat of a familiar motor adjustment to it. It then becomes an object. We do not respond to things but to objects. A thing becomes an object when we respond to it and an object has meaning for us in

so far as we know how to respond to it. An entirely new object would not be an object at all; it would be a thing and would possess no meaning. In so far as an object is a thing, *i. e.*, to the extent that its meaning is undetermined it belongs to the realm of "brute" existence. To the extent that we are unable to respond to an object it is brute and without meaning. Things are *brute* but objects have *meaning*. A problematic situation in which thinking occurs involves both a thing and an object, a partially brute existence and a partially meaningful object. In so far as the response is uncertain, the meaning of the object is ambiguous and it is a brute existence

If we all knew the meanings of different objects equally well we should have no need of each others' experiences. It is because the objects themselves are complex and need to be studied that we need our experts and specialists. The more these objects are studied the more meaning do they possess. An object is anything to which we respond. Our interests are determined by our objects and vice versa. The purpose of an education is that of bringing before an individual, many different interests so that he may know for what he is best adapted, know to what interests he will respond best. To say that we all live in the same world is absurd. We do not live in a bare metaphysical world but in our world of meanings and these meanings are determined by our objects of interest. Not all experiences are equally valuable. It is the function of education to select those experiences which are found most useful, to direct interests in fruitful objects and transmit these meanings from one generation to another.¹ In a complex society such as a modern civilized state, an individual could not meet the demands made upon him by modern life, were it not possible to bring him in contact with a large body of meanings through our school systems.

As to whether or not the meaning is in the object or the subject, it depends upon the phase of the logical process from which we view it. Without experience there certainly would be no meaning in an object. So long as we react directly toward an object the meaning is in the object but when we are in

1. Cf. Dewey: *Democracy and Education*.

doubt as to how to respond to it the meaning is subjective. It becomes objective when the hypothesis is verified. Meaning becomes objective through action. If we consider the point at which the problem arises, the meaning is subjective; while in its hypothetical stage it is also subjective. When an idea is acted upon and it works the meaning is then in the object. If we are viewing the matter from the point at which solution takes place, the meaning is in the object. Hypotheses which are never verified are subjective. When outside a logical situation meanings are objective. They are either subjective or objective according to the stage of the process from which we view them. To attempt to say that there is meaning apart from this process is fallacious. Meaning arises in the process of experience and to attempt to locate it in a particular phase of this process is merely an abstraction and false. There is meaning in an object when outside of a logical situation because of previous experience and previous inquiries. Translated into terms of external and internal relations, we may say that relations are external where the problem arises and while it is under investigation; they are internal when we have no problem and at the point of solution. Meanings are internal at the non-reflective level, are external while problematic and again become internal at the point of reconstruction.

We started with the position that instrumentalism is the tool by means of which the pragmatist defends the thesis of the relativity of truth, or that truth is relative to conditions and circumstances, these being determined by the needs of the problem under investigation. We then traced the stages of reflective thought, showing the point at which truth arises, that the distinction between truth and error appears when thought reaches its culmination either upon the verification or the abandonment of a hypothesis through action. We learned that an idea has meaning as it leads toward an object and that an object has its meaning in terms of the response and motor adjustments that it calls forth. Meaning arises in a total process of experience and to attempt to locate it without reference to the process which gives rise to it is fallacious.

We have examined the place of meaning in both pragmatism and realism and are now ready for a comparative valuation of the two positions.

CHAPTER IV.

Comparative Valuation

The present thesis is that the realist must face the pragmatist on the issue of meaning. That things exist apart from their being known in the sense that the realist uses the term, the pragmatist is perfectly willing to admit. Indeed, he never found it worth while questioning the fact. He considers Samuel Johnson's refutation of Bishop Berkeley sufficient without wasting perfectly good time and energy erecting such a majestic logical structure in support of it. Prof. Dewey says:

"The position taken in the essays is frankly realistic in¹ acknowledging that certain *brute existences*,* detected or laid bare by thinking but in no way constituted out of thought or any mental process, set every problem for reflection and hence serve to test its otherwise merely speculative results. It is simply insisted that as a matter of fact these *brute existences* are equivalent neither to the objective content of the situations, technological or artistic or social, in which thinking originates, nor to the things to be known—of the objects of knowledge.

That there is an external world the pragmatist has never questioned. He is amused that anyone should ever doubt the fact and why make so much ado about it? That this world of "brute existences" has any meaning the pragmatist disputes and, furthermore, challenges the realist to show that it has. The pragmatist is interested in a world of meanings, the world in which we live. A world that just everlastingly *is* simply does not interest him in the least. He cannot get up any enthusiasm for it and who can blame him? He is no more interested in such a world than he is in Kant's things-in-themselves. It has no meaning for him and why should he bother his head about it? When the realist insists that objective propositions have any meaning apart from the process of experience the pragmatist must part company with him.

1. Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 35.

*Italics mine.

That there are brute existences, the pragmatist does not question; as such he is not interested in them. His problem is that of determining the meaning of such existences so that they become *objects*.

We have seen that propositions constitute our data from the realistic viewpoint. They not only give us our data but they also furnish us with meanings. We observe the meaning in the proposition. Propositions are derived either from "facts of sense or the laws of logic."¹ Here Mr. Russell explicitly states that the laws of logic constitute our scientific data but when he is accused of having done so by Prof. Dewey, he denies it on the ground that his data are derived from epistemological sources,² epistemology here representing a "cross" between logic and psychology. Neither logic nor psychology furnishes us with data. Just how Mr. Russell is to reconcile this with the fact that we have knowledge of propositions only and that it is logic that deals with propositions,³ we are left somewhat in the dark.

After we question everything that is possible there will still be left a residuum which is unquestioned; this residuum constitutes our "hard" data.⁴ Mr. Russell admits that these hard data vary with different individuals and that they vary with the same individual under different conditions and circumstances, with different periods of his development. In so admitting it would seem that he had let the realistic cat out of the bag but he is entirely unconscious of the fact and still insists that there are certain "logical primitives." As Prof. Dewey remarks in another connection that "when the realist lets the nose of the idealistic camel into the tent, it is not surprising that the camel comes in and swallows up the tent," so when Mr. Russell so gracefully opens the door for psychology, he need not be surprised that psychology comes in and robs him of his independent logic.

The realistic position seems quite plausible until we begin to put some content into it. When we try to put any meaning into our "propositions," "facts," "system," "logical movement," etc., we begin to see that they are as blind and empty

1. Scientific Method in Philosophy, p. 72.

2. Cf. Journal of Phil., Psych. and Sc. Methods. Vol. XVI, No. 1, pp. 6-14.

3. Cf. Scientific Method in Philosophy, p. 57.

4. Cf. Scientific Method in Philosophy, p. 70, ff.

as Kant's categorical imperative until we introduce the human element, connect them up with some human purpose. Even our axioms and postulates are not fixed until we have a problem of some sort that calls for a solution. Mr. Russell himself admits that the hardest of our hard data change with conditions and circumstances. What does this mean but that our data become hard with reference to the problem at-hand? In every problem there always are facts which remain unquestioned and Mr. Russell is perfectly correct in maintaining that there is a residuum that remains unquestioned. This residuum does function as *hard* data but this is not the sense in which he is using the term. His conception of data is not a functional but a structural one; data are just given. Are the hard data of the physicist the same as those of the mediaeval theologian? And are the axioms and postulates of the present-day progressive theologian those of the modern catholic churchman? Of course they differ, as Mr. Russell would admit, but he fails to see that such an admission carries with it the recognition that his system of propositions cannot even get started without some human motive or purpose.

If our system cannot even get a start without reference to purposes of individuals, why expect that it should be able to maintain itself even though we grant it its initial movement? Taking a cross-section of the world today we should be able to deduce the course of human activities for the next century from the propositions that are now existing, provided that we could only discover a sufficient number of them. There would be nothing logically impossible about such a method; the only thing that prevents our being able to do this is the limited number of propositions before us. But if we could just empirically observe and discover a large enough number of these propositions, we should be able to predict the course of events with logical certainty. The mediaeval member of society took just this attitude, the "God's in His heavens all's well with the world" attitude; he left it to the objective system of propositions to work out the salvation of the world, and we know how well he succeeded in bettering his lot and at what a tremendous cost the little progress that was made was made at. Our plutocrats and our "stand-patters" would probably be only

too glad if our labor organizations and social reformers of various sorts would only let this objective system of propositions lead to its own logical outcome. But the world is too much awake to revert to this method again. We know that if a better day for society is ever going to come it will only be as human efforts put the implications into the system. The League of Nations did not come as the logical outcome of the war and will only become effective as *we* get behind it and so make it. It is not here by means of a system of propositions generating it by means of their own logical movement. The realistic propositions fail to take account of the function of intelligence in reshaping and remolding, not only the form of, but the course which propositions may take. They assume that intelligence does and can do nothing in the way of directing and controlling propositions, a perfectly unwarrantable assumption in the light of modern science.

If the realist is unable to introduce meaning into his system at this point, much more is he at a loss when he comes to distinguishing between true and false meanings. When his premises are unable to yield meaning of any kind it seems absurd to speak of true and false meanings but for the sake of argument, let us grant him this start but catch him at the other end of the process. "Process" is hardly correct because for the realist there seems to be no process about it.

Whether we identify the truth with the real with Montague, state it as a one-one correlation between an existent and a subsistent as Spaulding does, connect it with a system of mutually consistent propositions (a la Holt) or hold the position of a three-term relation with Russell, in all cases the same criticism applies. Each theory leads only to a correspondence theory of truth and offers us no means of telling when we have and when we have not a true correspondence. The problem is essentially the same with all four positions. With Montague it takes the form of determining the real from the unreal. To substitute "real and unreal" for "truth and error" hardly offers a solution to the problem. Our problem was originally that of finding a criterion for truth and error, and to translate it into terms of the real and the unreal without any further means of differentiation is merely a verbal

solution. The same difficulty presents itself in Spaulding's statement in being unable to tell when we have an existent and when we have only a subsistent. Prof. Holt is in no better position to help us for there is no proposition which will not fit in perfectly consistently with some system; it may be perfectly consistent with a system of false propositions and how are we to determine the true consistency as over against the false? Nor can Mr. Russell come to our rescue at this point for how are we to know when the relation really does relate the terms and when it does not. All of our statements only end in so much verbiage for they all insist that truth is truth and that error is error, but offer us no means of knowing when we have the one and when we have the other.

Mr. Russell is forced to alternate between the positions of making truth a property of beliefs and that of making it a property of propositions. On the one hand we are told that were it not for beliefs and judgment, as respecting truth and falsity the world would be neutral; truth and falsity are applicable to our beliefs only, but on the other hand we are informed that truth and falsity are properties of propositions. Propositions are either true or false regardless of our assertions about them. A mere judgment about a proposition does not affect it in the least; it is no different when asserted than when an unasserted proposition. Even our propositions are not quite the objective sort of an affair that we should expect to find for it will be remembered that Mr. Russell's propositions are *a form of words* or that which may significantly be *asserted or denied*. These, just as Prof. Holt's entities which are outside a certain "universe of discourse," sound somewhat psychological and vitiate Mr. Russell's logical position. His realistic position is abandoned and his propositions serve as sort of a mediator between a judgment and a fact just as his data are a go-between between logic and psychology. His propositions form sort of a *tertium quid* by means of which he is able to smuggle in meaning to otherwise meaningless facts. They form sort of a half-way station between a subjective individual and an objective fact; they pose as completely objective and it is only as we go back and examine Mr. Russell's initial statement about propositions, that we realize his realistic position has been vitiated from the start.

Dr. Montague is placed in the same predicament. He confesses that without our beliefs we should never have any conception of truth and error.¹ These categories would not apply to the real world. Nevertheless, we are told that error is quite as objective as truth and that our beliefs about the world have nothing to do with the real world; they have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of those beliefs. The true-ness or the falsity of the beliefs depends upon the real world. Thus we are told on the one hand that these attributes are properties of beliefs and on the other that they belong to things quite independent of our judgments about them.

The realist prides himself upon being able to know the real world, the world as it actually is. With reference to the possibility of knowledge, Mr. Russell's analysis does not leave us in a much better position than Bosanquet left us at the close of his discussion of judgment. Bosanquet burns his bridges behind him and erects a new structure upon which inference may safely guide us to truth but Mr. Russell is not so considerate of our feelings. He leaves us in our "private worlds"² which refer to an objective system of perspectives, but how we are to know when our private perspective truly corresponds to the real perspective, we are never told. We may assume that it does but in so assuming we have precluded the possibility for error and are consequently left in no better position; in so assuming we should be left in the kind of a world in which Bosanquet asks us to dwell in his discussion of inference, a world without error and a world in which all things are true.

That inferences cannot be drawn equally well from all data, Mr. Russell is quite right in observing, but that his scale arranged according to degrees of vagueness for inferential purposes, constitutes data,³ is quite another question. How we could arrange such a scale without reference to any specific problem is a mystery. Facts which serve as data in one situation may not even be summoned for that purpose in another situation. While serving as a distinct datum in one situation the same might serve as a vague datum in another situa-

1. Cf. *The New Realism*, pp. 252-62.

2. Cf. *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, p. 88, ff., p. 111.

3. Cf. *Jour. of Phil., Psych. and Sc. Meth.*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, p. 10 ff.

tion, or the same fact might be either vague or distinct according to the different stages of the problem's solution. Data arranged in an objective scale similar to a space-time-quality series would be perfectly useless for scientific purposes. It would be impossible to arrange such a scale in the first place, but granted that it were possible, it would have no particular value after completion. Facts that have no bearing on the problem do not even constitute data. A man has failed to pass the literacy test. This fact constitutes a datum from which inferences may be drawn concerning him. It might belong to our class of distinct data with reference to his education but might fall in the class of vague data concerning his ability as a mechanic. Placing this fact in our scale of data, how should we proceed so as to know where to place it? We cannot place it with reference to a problem for then should our scale be vitiated by a psychological taint, a serious crime from the realistic viewpoint. Yet how are we to get any meaning into it without this taint?

Although the realist would never admit it, his difficulties prove very similar to those of the idealist. We do not hear so much about the "Whole" in realism as we do in idealism but his ultimate entities perform exactly the same function. The Whole is just as intelligible a concept as true and real entities, just as easy to get at and just as workable as a method. Both bring us to a correspondence* theory of truth based upon the separation of the real and the ideal worlds. An independent thought must in some way match an independent reality. Since we have no way of getting at the real world, we can never know when such a correspondence is effected. The only way we can make the theory work at all is by denying error, and by so doing, we have only another problem on our hands and consequently have not gained anything. Both realism and idealism ultimately rest upon the "aviary" conception of truth and error. If our birds were only labeled how handy it would be, but since they are not, as Plato long ago pointed out, how are we to know when we

*Bosanquet objects to the correspondence theory, holding that consistency is the ultimate test. So long as he accepts the Absolute it is difficult to see how he escapes the correspondence viewpoint. Prof. Holt might also object to being placed in this class but the same criticism applies for his consistent system must match a neutral order.

have captured a true and when a false bird?¹ The outcome simply shows how impossible it is for a paralytic to get any meaning into his world. From both the idealistic and the realistic accounts of knowledge, one would never know that we have any such thing as muscles or ever indulged in such a useless performance as acting. Neither the photographic conception of the realist, nor the cinematographic conception of the idealist is adequate to make our world intelligible. In a world without action we should be quite at a loss to distinguish truth from error. If life were presented as a mere panorama, how should we ever have any conception of truth? Indeed the pictures themselves would be meaningless, for without having previously acted with reference to similar objects, the scenes would be as unintelligible as yiddish. It is at this point that the pragmatist comes to our rescue and gives us a world of meaning.

The fallacy of the realist is that of interesting himself so much in the object of science that he overlooks the importance of the method. True enough, he does have a method but it is subordinated to his object of interest. It does not play any role in the reconstruction of its object. He does more or less consciously apply the pragmatic method, just as does the idealist, but in so doing he is not consistent with his premises. He offers us a statement of the truth but gives us no method for recognizing it when we get it. Consequently he cannot help us in a scientific problem, except in so far as he abandons his realistic position and introduces meaning into his otherwise meaningless world. It is one thing to give a statement of what truth is and another to propose a method for finding it. Obviously the statement without the method is worthless for we never know when the facts we obtain correspond with our statement. To say that truth is a correspondence between an existent and a subsistent, or a relation that actually holds between terms, does not help us very much when we have no way of finding out when we have an existent, or when the relation really does relate. Failure to provide a method of differentiation simply makes the statement false.

1. Cf. A. W. Moore: *The Aviary Conception of Truth and Error* in *Jour. of Phil., Psych. and Sc. Meth.*, Vol. X, p. 542.

The realist's reply would be that he has a method and a perfectly good one at that. It is that of observing, analyzing, measuring, finding the constant factors and stating the results in terms of a simple law.¹ The position taken here is that the propositions that he observes, analyzes, and generalizes about have no meaning in his realistic statement of them. He cannot get any meaning into them without surreptitiously smuggling it in as Mr. Russell does. Prof. Holt would be unable to recognize the kind of a proposition he sets forth were he confronted with one for it would have no meaning. So long as Prof. Spaulding is content to talk about things *existing* apart from their being known, he can get quite a hearing, but were he to introduce the element of meaning into his existence on such a platform, his followers and admirers would begin to decrease in number. Prof. Perry, although a "real" realist, has given a most excellent statement of the pragmatic attitude toward science. He says:

"Science both belittles man and magnifies him. When² science puts man where he belongs in nature, man looks very small and very feeble. But what is this science that makes so free with man? Evidently in some sense it is the work of man himself. Whatever superiority science enjoys through the discomfiture of man must be credited to the scientist, who is, curiously enough, *man*. Man is apparently on both ends of the see-saw. When one end goes up the other goes down; but man being on both ends is always on top! I shall not attempt to resolve this paradox here. Suffice it to say that if the teachings or doctrines of science concerning man seriously diminish his confidence and self-esteem, the magnificent and overwhelming success of science as *his own activity and his own institution* have restored them again."*

This from a realist! Who could ask for better pragmatism? Science itself is quite meaningless until we recognize that it is the work of man and that it is his institution; it is his instrument for purposes of control. This control is with reference to human problems and human activities. What meaning has it apart from these? Realism fails us at the point of meaning.

This brings us to the crucial point. It is that of the ob-

1. Cf. Present Philosophical Tendencies, Ch. III.

2. Perry: Present Conflict of Ideals, p. 45.

*Italics mine.

ject of knowledge. That which constitutes knowledge for the realist is not knowledge at all for the pragmatist. It is either the results of previous knowledge processes or is the beginning of knowledge. Knowledge for the realist is simply a matter of becoming aware of a proposition; it is immediate recognition or perception of an object. Knowledge for the pragmatist is the result of inquiry; the object of knowledge is its objective, *i. e.*, the end toward which thought is directed in the solution of a problem. Perception is not knowledge for the pragmatist; it sets a problem for knowledge but does not itself constitute knowledge. Knowledge itself is always the result of a doubt-inquiry situation; it appears as the resolution of a problematic situation. Immediate awareness of an object is not knowledge from the pragmatic viewpoint.

This difference in the conception of knowledge of the two positions will throw some light on the controversy as to whether knowing makes any difference in the character of the object known. The pragmatist contends that it does while the realist is equally as insistent in maintaining that it does not. Each is right from his viewpoint; it is the ambiguity of the word "knowledge" that has caused an unnecessary amount of confusion. If knowledge is a matter of simply perceiving something already known, the realist is quite right in holding that knowledge makes no difference to the object known; if, however, knowledge is not simply a matter of immediate recognition but is the result of an investigation, the pragmatist is equally right in contending that it does alter the character of the object known. Knowledge for the pragmatist is not a matter of just *knowing*; it is knowing how to do something. An act of thought is not complete until it has been carried out in action. The problem remains in its hypothetical state until an idea has been acted upon, until an hypothesis has either been rejected or accepted. This again states the issue, *viz.*, that thinking is not a matter of just watching "wheels go 'round" but that it is instrumental to the control of conduct. Using thinking in the former sense, as the realist apparently does, he is quite right in maintaining that it makes no difference in the nature of the object known, but if we use it in the instrumental function, as does

the pragmatist, he is quite as correct in contending that it does affect the object.

Suppose you are suffering from a severe cold. The consciousness of this physical condition on your part constitutes knowledge from the standpoint of the realist. You are aware of having a cold; this fact is knowledge. Why call this knowledge? says the pragmatist. There is no thought involved in such a recognition. This is simply the beginning of a knowledge situation. The fact that you are suffering gives rise to a problem as to how to act with reference to curing your cold. You formulate various hypotheses and act upon the one which seems to you most likely to secure the best results. If the cold disappears because of such action on your part, it is certainly a different object than it was when you were suffering from it. Simply being aware of a disagreeable physical condition does not alter the condition, but intelligent action with reference to restoring health certainly does make a difference in the character of the object known. It is the becoming aware of a healthy condition after having acted upon an idea directed toward the overcoming of an undesirable condition that constitutes knowledge, and not the mere apprehension of that undesirable condition. The object of knowledge in this case is the curing of your cold, the objective toward which thought is directed; it is not simply the apprehension of having a cold.

The question now reduces itself to the merits of the respective viewpoints in regard to knowledge. The fallacy of the realist, as Prof. Dewey points out,¹ is in disregarding the temporal character of knowledge. His immediate apprehension he sets up as knowledge, but fails to recognize that even this is possible only because of previous investigations. The results of former inquiries he sets up as knowledge, whereas they constitute data which may be brought to bear upon present and future knowing situations. After we have learned a meaning through the process of investigation, the realist turns around and says that it was always there. He abstracts meaning from both phases of the knowledge process and then sets up his meaning quite independent of that process. He

1. Cf. *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 25 ff.

fails to recognize that knowledge is in the making, that in abstracting his meaning, both from the non-reflective level and at the point of solution, he not only cuts off the possibility of further discovery but makes it equally impossible for knowledge ever to get started. We may disregard the temporal character of judgment if we like, but in so doing we only land in the old Platonic aviary with all the mysteries of the Socratic puzzle.

The realist's reply to this is that the pragmatist merely gives us a biography as to how certain meanings have been derived. The object itself, together with its meaning, exists quite independent of this process of knowledge; it is in no way altered by this process. The biography is all very interesting but what has it to do with the object known? Thus the Ptolemaic theory in astronomy was not true because people for centuries believed that it was the correct theory in regard to the stellar cosmos. Simply because Copernicus gave us a better theory the real character of the heavens was by no means altered. This is an interesting incident in the history of astronomy, but the Copernican theory, if true today, always has been true. Our reply is, that if truth exists apart from this knowledge process, then must we abandon all hopes of knowledge, for we have then only a metaphysical object which it is impossible for us to reach. On this basis, how should we know that the Copernican theory is the true one? It is only as we associate it with some human problem that we find it either true or false. Prof. Perry has so well stated how meaningless is our science except as we view it as the work of man himself. If this biography of discovery makes no difference as to bare existence, it is quite essential for meaning, and as we have above noted, it is this world in which the pragmatist is interested. To ignore this biography of knowledge as the realist does, leaves us in a bare metaphysical world, a world of mere *isness*, one in which the pragmatist is not at all interested. In short, the realist, in his enthusiasm over the independence of this bare existence, eliminates the possibility of knowledge, thus defeating the very purpose of his thesis of independence. He arose as the champion of this thesis to safeguard knowledge from the subjective clutches of

Berkeleyan idealism. In the defense of his thesis he is left with a meaningless world, thereby leaving knowledge in no better position than Bishop Berkeley left it. What a paradox! The realist's fundamental thesis has defeated its own primary purpose. He thought it a crime that knowledge should modify the character of the object known, for such a state of affairs would make all our efforts to know the real character of things useless, for that real character would be falsified through the knowledge relation. He therefore set up the independence of the object and ardently defended it by his theory of the externality of relations. In so doing his object becomes independent all-right but it is so independent that it becomes impossible to get any meaning into it. He is in a worse predicament than his friend the idealist. For the latter, knowledge becomes fictitious, but for him it becomes impossible.

If the idealist is guilty of the fallacy of "definition by initial predication," the realist is guilty of a fallacy still more grave, viz., that of definition by "essential attributes." If initial predication could give us the *essential* attributes, it would not be fallacious from the realist's standpoint. It is so because it picks out a mere "accident" as an essential. Meanings which are entirely irrelevant to the real character of the object are taken for its essence. The pragmatist challenges the realist to show the essential attributes of any object apart from some human purpose. If he can do this then can he make good his realistic position in regard to meaning. But if he fails then must he abandon his realistic position at this point. Prof. James' point that there is no essential attribute of anything¹ is apropos in this connection. Meanings are essential or non-essential according to the purpose for definition. The classic illustration of the artist, the botanist and the farmer viewing a plant for purposes of definition shows the impossibility of selecting "essentials" apart from the problem and interest of the observer. Prof. James' own illustration of the piece of paper which may be used for purposes of writing, for starting a fire, as a signal, or as an aesthetic object, etc., is another case in point. Which of these various attributes is essential to the piece of paper? Obviously there is no one meaning that

1. Principles of Psychology, Vol. 11, p. 333.

is essential apart from the purpose for which the paper is to be used. Meanings are essential or non-essential with reference to the interest of an individual or the demands of a problem. How would you determine your essentials apart from this purposeful reference? To abstract a meaning from its interest relation and set it up as the eternal essence of an object apart from its relation is the fallacy of the realist. If the realist can show that it is possible to define an object outside of this interest relation, then his realistic position holds, but if not, it fails at the point of meaning.

It is just this fallacy of definition by essential attributes that gets in the way of progress. Because a certain meaning has been of value in a given situation, it is then set up as an "essential attribute" or an "inalienable right" of some kind which makes it impossible for society to be free to reconstruct its own ends. Thus the doctrine of "natural rights" served its purpose at the time of the American Revolution but is now in the way of governmental legislation for purposes of controlling wealth and labor conditions. The Monroe Doctrine is another case of "necessary foreign policy," which when translated into logical terms, becomes that of "essential attributes." "We always have had war and are going to have it," is another case of interfering with progress by definition. States always have been "beyond" morality in their relations with one another and consequently must always so be; they would not be states if they were moral in their relations; secret and deceitful diplomacy are the essential attributes of states. All this is only another way of saying "politics is politics" and why try to make them anything different? It represents the attitude of definition by "essential attributes" toward life. It simply blocks all hope for progress.

The realist has such a phobia for subjectivism that when the pragmatist says that knowledge does make a difference in the character of the object known he accuses him of holding that knowledge is constitutive of its object. Both Prof. Perry and Prof. Spaulding—as well as Prof. Bosanquet, the idealist—bring this accusation against the pragmatist.¹ They evi-

1. Perry: *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 197-203.
Spaulding: *New Rationalism*, Ch. XXXIII.
Bosanquet: *Logic*, Vol. II, Ch. IX.

dently are not familiar with the following passage from Prof. Dewey:

"For the more one insists that the antecedent situation¹ is constituted by thought, the more one has to wonder why another type of thought is required; what need arouses it, and how it is possible for it to improve upon the work of previous constitutive thought. This difficulty at once forces idealists from a logic of experience as it is completely experienced into a metaphysic of a purely hypothetical experience. Constitutive thought precedes *our* conscious thought-operations; hence it must be the working of some absolute universal which, unconsciously to our reflection, builds up an organized world. But this recourse only deepens the difficulty. How does it happen that the absolute constitutive and intuitive Thought does such a poor and bungling job that it requires a finite discursive activity to patch up its products? Here more metaphysic is called for: The Absolute Reason is now supposed to work under to limiting conditions of finitude, of a sensitive and temporal organism. The antecedents of reflective thought are not, therefore, determinations of thought pure and undefiled, but of what thought can do when it stoops to assume the yoke of change and of feeling. I pass by the metaphysical problem left unsolved by this flight; Why and how should a perfect, absolute, complete, finished thought find it necessary to submit to alien, disturbing, and corrupting conditions in order, in the end, to recover through reflective thought in a partial, piecemeal, wholly inadequate way what it possessed at the outset in a much more satisfactory way?"

Does this sound as though the instrumentalist has very much use for constitutive thought? No, the pragmatist does not hold that thought constitutes its object. What he does insist on is that it *reconstructs* its object. Thought is regulative, not constitutive; it is reconstructive, not constructive; it is instrumental and active, not passive and ineffective.

Knowledge from the point of view of the realist is not only impossible, but would be useless, granted that it were possible. His thesis is that knowing in no way affects the character of the object known. If this be true, why bother to know at all? Why waste so much time and energy in the pursuit of knowledge? Knowledge makes no difference in the way things behave; they would act the way they do whether known or not. In order to make good on his thesis that knowl-

1. Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 131, 132.

edge makes no difference in the object known, the realist must admit the futility of science and the uselessness of knowledge.

If knowledge does not alter its object, what hope have we of control? Of what value is our science? Obviously the object is different when known than when unknown. If knowledge is an essential factor in the killing of germs, who can say that the germs are no different when known than when unknown? The disease traced to these germs is certainly a different object when sanitary precautions are observed than when the germs are allowed to run around loose. Here let us again remember that the object of knowledge is its objective, viz., in this particular instance that of curing a disease; it is not the mere becoming aware of a germ and taking no action with reference to it. But, moreover, even this becoming aware involves a certain amount of experimentation. The act of thought would not be complete at this stage of awareness for the problem would remain hypothetical. If we take the realistic position in regard to knowledge then our knowledge is useless. If what the realist holds is the object of knowledge, it does, of course, make no difference to the object known. The difficulty in holding this view is that it not only makes knowledge impossible, but makes it of no use, conceding its possibility. The paradox of the situation is that the realist, who builds his philosophy primarily in the interests of epistemology, simply begs the problem by assuming a false object of knowledge, while the pragmatist, who has an abhorrence for epistemology, concerns himself primarily with a method for determining the meaning of the object of knowledge.

The old Greek controversy between Socrates and the Sophists is still raging in present-day philosophy in a modified form between the pragmatists and the realists. The realist asks us to go "back to Plato," while the pragmatist would have us move "on to Protagoras." "From Plato to Protagoras"¹ is Dr. Schiller's watchword. He holds that it was Plato, who by his misconception of the function of a concept, gave us a static world and that if we desire a world compatible with change and progress, we must move "on to Protagoras." In the Greek controversy Plato won out; we can-

1. Cf. *Studies in Humanism*, Essay II.

not afford to let him win today. To follow Protagoras is not to return; it is a step forward, a movement in the right direction, says Dr. Schiller. At Plato's time the Protagorean relativism was horrifying. The present generation sees nothing vicious in such relativism. It has faith in intelligence to conceive the better and act with reference to it. Indeed the demand of a progressive society to be free to reconstruct its own ends not only makes such relativism desirable, but makes it imperative. Furthermore, judgment is not relative to the individual as an isolated and independent unit, but is social in character because the individual himself is social. It is this social character of judgment that corrects the "viciousness" of its relativism. The pragmatist is not afraid of chaos resulting for he has a method for the determining of values and has faith in intelligence in the application of this method. He sees no particular virtue in deceiving ourselves in thinking that our own judgments of value are *objective* and *universal*, while the other fellow, who does not happen to agree with us, is tainted with subjectivism. Thus Professor Dewey says:

"Because Mr. James recognizes that the personal element¹ enters into judgments passed upon whether a problem has or has not been satisfactorily solved, he is charged with extreme subjectivism, with encouraging the element of personal preference to run rough-shod over all objective controls. Now the question raised . . . is primarily one of fact, not of doctrine. Is or is not a personal factor found in truth evaluations? If it is, pragmatism is not responsible for introducing it. If it is not, it ought to be possible to refute pragmatism by appeal to empirical fact, rather than reviling it for subjectivism. Now it is an old story that philosophers, in common with theologians and social theorists, are so sure that personal habits and interests shape their opponents' doctrines as they are that their own beliefs are 'absolutely' universal and objective in quality. Hence arises that dishonesty, that insincerity characteristic of philosophic discussion . . . Now the moment the complicity of the personal factor in our philosophic valuations is recognized, is recognized fully, frankly, and generally, that moment a new era in philosophy will begin. We shall have to discover the personal factors that now influence us unconsciously, and begin to accept a new and moral responsibility for them, a responsibility for judging and testing them by their consequences. So long as we ignore this

1. Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 326, 7.

factor, its deeds will be largely evil, not because *it* is evil, but because, flourishing in the dark, it is without responsibility and without check. The only way to control it is by recognizing it. And while I would not prophesy of pragmatism's future, I would say that this element which is now so generally condemned as intellectual dishonesty (perhaps because of an uneasy, instinctive recognition of the searching of hearts its acceptance would involve) will in the future be accounted unto philosophy for righteousness' sake."

It is this personal element that the realist ignores. The price he pays is that he is left in a world without meaning.

Because Plato* failed to recognize the functional value of concepts and set them up as metaphysical entities, eternal ideas or abstract essences, ideals have been pitched in the clouds as something toward which we should eternally strive but never quite realize. Our conduct with reference to morality is like a variable approaching a constant; we may keep moving toward our goal but never quite get there. Because the pragmatist has no use for such abstract ideals, he is accused of having none at all; he is just moving but is not going anywhere. He indulges in "action for action's sake" but has no end for acting. Thus Prof. Perry tells the following story¹ that is supposed to be characteristic of pragmatism. "A negro had inadvertently broken into a wasp's nest. As he was rushing headlong down the road he was stopped by a white man, and asked where he was going. He replied, 'I ain't goin' nowhere, boss. I'se just leavin' the place where I was at.'" For those who cannot be moved without a pull from above this criticism may be true, but for the pragmatic temperament which is satisfied with a push from within and a reach toward the kind of an ideal which intelligence generates, it is hardly fair. The pragmatist thinks it better to move with reference to specific problems rather than to rave on about a lot of abstract ideals which are meaningless until brought into experience in relation to given situations. The ideal for the pragmatist is his hypothesis, the idea upon which he acts for the purpose of bettering a concrete situation. His goal is that which his problem sets and he fails to see why it is necessary to have a Platonic essence as a goal in order

1. Present Conflict of Ideals, p. 346.

*The reference is to the celestial Plato for there are two Platos, the celestial and the terrestrial, the latter having to a large extent been lost sight of by the former.

to be moving toward an end. In fact he prefers to move in this way for he sees that it is the disregard of the personal factor in judgments of value together with this loyalty to Platonic Ideas that justifies untold suffering and misery on the part of concrete individuals for the sake of an abstract humanity. One of the reasons that war never realizes its ideals—or rather the ideals that were supposed to be at stake—is that the ideals themselves have been pulled down from the clouds, and after the excitement is over they fail to function because they are blind and empty, void of content and without meaning. They have not grown up on the soil of individual experience. It is this soil alone that can give them meaning, give them nourishment and vitality that they may be effective.¹ The world war is a case in point. Pragmatism is not moving any place in general, but it does aim to move definitely with reference to particular problems. Realism may be moving somewhere in general but gets nowhere in particular. It is simply a question as to which is the better way to move. The pragmatist, who sees no meaning in general movements, could equally as well accuse the realist of having no goal, since for him a general goal is no goal at all. As a matter of fact, the realist does move in about the same way as does the pragmatist—and the idealist as well for that matter. The reason that the realist and the idealist do so act is because they abandon their metaphysical premises under the pressure of having to act in life. It is only in their professional capacities that truth and right are absolute. This, however, does afford some consolation at times of great crises but the pragmatist, whose duty it was to laugh the absolute out of court, is not so successful in deceiving himself*

The educational import of the pragmatic functional ideal as the *better* of which the individual conceives in a concrete situation as over against the realistic subsistential, entitative ideal, is that it enables an ideal to be vitalized, enables it to function in conduct; it enables it to get tied up with the nervous system in such a way that it finds expression for itself in activity. The realistic entity is a ready-made form which

1. Cf. Schiller: *Studies in Humanism*, Essay VI.

*Mr. Russell is a good pragmatist in this respect. Judging by his attitude toward the recent war, he evidently did not find much consolation in the abstract ideals of Justice and Democracy.

is supposed to fit every situation and consequently applies to none. It is sort of a universal coat which nobody can wear. In designing it to fit everybody it practically fits nobody. It therefore is empty and without content; it possesses no meaning and hence can function in experience only as it is thrust upon us. Here again, we must not forget a favorite pragmatic thesis, viz., that thinking is instrumental *to conduct*. An ideal that just *is* cannot function in conduct, and hence, from the pragmatic viewpoint, has no particular value. This is the fallacy of beautiful moral sentiments that fail to express themselves in action. It is the morality of mere words; words have meaning only in so far as they express themselves through conduct. The pragmatist does not divorce theory and practice; he believes in thinking and acting in the same world. One cannot act in a world of subsistential entities and an ideal that is located in such a realm is impotent so far as influencing conduct is concerned. The realist has a ready-made meaning which we may acquire; the pragmatist has his meanings in the making; they arise through the process of inquiry.¹

Both Prof. Spaulding and Prof. Perry accuse pragmatism of being "anti-intellectual."² If we mean by "anti-intellectual" a thought that *just thinks*, the pragmatist pleads guilty to the charge; he not only glories in the fact but prides himself upon not having such a kind of thought. If, however, we mean by "anti-intellectual" the discouraging and depreciation of intelligence, the accusation is not just. Anti-intellectual should not be taken to mean anti-intelligent. Perhaps the realist does not mean to convey the latter meaning by the term, and if not, the pragmatist has no objection to being called "anti-intellectual" if the realist gets any particular satisfaction out of having it thus. No philosophy puts a higher premium on intelligence than does pragmatism, and lest the realist's charge of anti-intellectualism should convey the impression that the pragmatist underestimates or in any way disparages the function of intelligence for purposes of control, let me quote once more from Prof. Dewey:

1. Cf. *Democracy and Education*.

2. Cf. *The New Rationalism*, pp. 274-83.

Present Conflict of Ideals. Ch. XX, Sect. 1, III.

"We pride ourselves upon being realistic, desiring a hard-headed cognizance of facts, and devoted to mastering the means of life. We pride ourselves upon a practical idealism, a lively and easily moved faith in possibilities as yet unrealized, in willingness to make sacrifice for their realization. Idealism easily becomes a sanction of waste and careflessness, and realism a sanction of legal formalism in behalf of things as they are—the right of the possessor. We thus tend to combine a loose and ineffective optimism with assent to the doctrine of take who take can: a deification of power. All peoples at all times have been narrowly realistic in practice and have then employed idealization to cover up in sentiment and theory their brutalities. But never, perhaps, has the tendency been so dangerous and so tempting as with ourselves. Faith in the power of *intelligence** to imagine a future which is the projection of the desirable in the present, and to invent the instrumentalities of its realization, is our salvation. And it is a faith which must be nurtured and made articulate: surely a sufficiently large task for our philosophy."

Compare the above with this from Prof. Perry:

"There is nothing dispiriting in realism. It involves the² acceptance of the given situation as it is, with no attempt to think or imagine it already good. But involves no less the conception of the reality and power of life. It is opposed equally to an idealistic anticipation of the victory of spirit, and to a naturalistic confession of the impotence of spirit. In this sense all bold and forward living is realistic. It involves a sense for things as they are, an ideal of things as they should be, and a determination that, through enlightened action, things shall in time come to be what they *should be**."

The obvious criticism of the realist's position at this point is that with his realistic premises, he would find it quite impossible to make things as they "should be." He starts with an "alien world" in which knowledge makes no difference in the character of the object known. If this be true how can enlightened action in any way influence the implications which necessarily hold between propositions? The realist must either admit the pragmatic object of knowledge or confess the futility of science for purposes of control. If he grants the pragmatist this point, he is forced to abandon his realistic position; if he refuses he defeats the purposes of science and his own efforts to know are without meaning.

1. Creative Intelligence, pp. 68, 69.

2. Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 347.

*Italics mine.

The realist is so haunted by subjectivism that when the pragmatist insists upon the creative aspect of intelligence, he is accused of manufacturing a world by sitting down and thinking it into existence. This seems so utterly abhorrent to the realist that he keeps telling us "the thing exists, the thing exists, etc.," until such a commonplace begins to sound profound. The pragmatist has never tried to deny the fact that the thing does exist. Of course it does but why talk about it? If, instead of talking about things existing apart from their being known, the realist would tell us that *meaning* exists in such a form, perhaps much of the misunderstanding between realism and pragmatism might be avoided. When pressed in his position, the realist always gains a hearing by coming back at us with the cry of "things exist apart from their being known." This is well and good so long as he is speaking with the disciples of Bishop Berkeley, but why accuse the pragmatist of the Bishop's sins? Mr. Russell seems still to be laboring under this delusion. He writes:

"Dr. Schiller says that the external world was first discovered by a low marine animal whom he calls 'Grumps,' who swallowed a bit of rock that disagreed with him, and argued that he would not have given himself such a pain, and therefore there must be an external world. One is tempted to think that, at the time when Prof. Dewey wrote, many people in the newer countries had not yet made the disagreeable experience which Grumps made. Meanwhile, whatever accusations pragmatists may bring, I shall continue to protest that *it was not I who made the world.*"*

Nor is Mr. Russell alone in so protesting for he has our hearty co-operation in thus protesting. When, however, the realist insists that the implications of propositions are just *there* and that intelligence* can do nothing in the way of controlling these implications, pragmatists rise up in protest, and despite realistic contentions to the contrary, insist that we have a part in the making of the world, the re-shaping and remolding of reality. It is in this sense that intelligence is *creative*.

1. "Professor Dewey's 'Essays in Experimental Logic' " in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, p. 26.

*Throughout the discussion intelligence has been used in its broader meaning. See author's article on "Ethics and Logic" in *International Journal of Ethics*, April, '22.

*Italics mine.

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